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THE FUTURE OF CIVIL MONETARY




The enactment by Congress of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969 (Coal Mine Act)' began a new era of federal
regulation which now extends not only to coal mines but also to
the workplace and to the environment. In addition to providing
extensive and detailed regulation of coal mines, Congress imposed
the most comprehensive and, in the opinion of many in the mining
industry, the most stringent system of enforcement ever enacted
into law. What Congress did was to mandate that every violation
of the Coal Mine Act or the regulations promulgated pursuant to
it be assessed a civil penalty. These mandatory civil penalties are
to be assessed regardless of the violation. Even the most trivial
violation is assessed a penalty. To back up these mandatory civil
penalties, Congress established additional specialized civil penal-
ties and criminal penalties.
The major legal challenges to this Act have not been the tradi-
tional ones directed toward the basic authority of the Interior De-
partment to promulgate regulations and to administer a far-flung
program. The challenge now is to the method of enforcing the
governmental policy. One author has pointed out:
Government by agency regulation is here to stay. Only the
methods, including the sanctions used, are subject to change.2
* B.A., University of Arizona, 1969; J.D., University of Arizona, 1972. This
thesis was submitted to the faculty of the National Law Center of the George
Washington University in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Laws in Environmental Law.
30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970).
2 McKay, Robert B., Sanctions in Motion: The Administrative Process, 49
IOWA L. REv. 441 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Sanctions in Motion].
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This article will focus on these monetary civil penalties and
on the legal challenges to them as an enforcement tool.
The importance of characterizing a penalty as civil or criminal
will be analyzed in detail. The legal rationale for each type of
penalty will be discussed with special emphasis placed on the stan-
dards applied by the courts in determining whether a penalty is
civil or criminal in nature. Since challenges to the criminal aspects
of the penalty are often asserted by those opposing such fines, the
views of the Supreme Court are especially important. The prob-
lems of dual monetary penalties will then be analyzed. Two recent
cases challenging this system of dual penalties will be discussed.3
Each of these cases represents a strong challenge to the concept of
dual penalties and monetary penalties in general.
Once the legal framework surrounding the civil penalty sys-
tem is established, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the civil
monetary penalty system itself will be made. Two similar health
and safety statutes will be considered. First, the Federal Metal and
Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act (Metal Mine Act) will be discussed.
Next, the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Coal
Mine Act) will be covered.' The relationship between these Acts
provides an ideal context for comparing the effectiveness of two
conceptually different monetary penalties in administering con-
gressional programs. Each Act is enforced by the same agency, the
Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration,' and each uti-
lizes a similar administrative enforcement organization. A crucial
difference is the lack of any meaningful monetary penalties in the
Metal Mine Act and the mandatory civil penalties in the Coal
Mine Act. The Coal Mine Act's penalties are extremely stringent,
and if this Act proves to be successful, it should establish the
mandatory civil penalty as an important enforcement tool.
This comparison of the Acts will demonstrate the central the-
sis of this article-that mandatory monetary penalties, for all their
legal and administrative problems, are the most effective means
3 United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. La. 1974),
rev'd 537 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976).
Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd on rehearing, 519 F.2d 1215 (1975), cert. granted,
424 U.S. 964 (1976) (No. 75-746, 1976 Term).
30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970).
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for securing a vigorously and effectively enforced congressional
program.
I. NATURE OF SANCTIONS
A monetary penalty is a fine imposed in dollar amount for the
commission of an act not in conformity with regulatory or statutory
standards.6 Monetary penalties fall into two broad catego-
ries-criminal penalties and civil penalties.7 The nature of the
penalty determines the rights of the penalized party and the duties
of the government.' The penalized party generally desires that the
penalty be treated as criminal in nature so that the maximum
number of defenses may be asserted. The government generally
desires to have the monetary penalty treated as civil in nature so
as to short-circuit the burdensome criminal law requirements.9
The amount of the penalty need not vary when the penalty is
denominated civil or criminal. Often, the amount of the penalty
is the same regardless of label and the money is paid to the general
treasury.
Criminal penalties are often distinguished from civil penalties
by "whether the legislative aim in providing the sanction was to
punish the individual . . . or to regulate the activity in question
... ,,," The deterrent nature of a criminal penalty arises from the
stigma attached to a criminal charge. This stigma provides power-
ful incentive to a violator to perform the required acts."
The only consequence of a civil penalty is a monetary judg-
ment in favor of the government.' 2 The civil penalty seeks to deter
statutory violations, although some statutes also attempt to use
the collected money as compensation. 3 The main advantage of the
See 30 U.S.C. § 819 (1970).
This dichotomy is refined into many subcategories. In some cases the distinc-
tion between civil and criminal penalties, as will be shown, becomes blurred.
Charney, Jonathan I., The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defen-
dants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 478 (1974) [hereinafter referred
to as Constitutional Protections in Civil Penalty Cases].
9 This generalization is not always true. A defendant may prefer civil penalties
so as to avoid the stigma of a criminal action. The government, of course, may
demand a criminal conviction.
,0 United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
" United States v. Skil Corporation, 351 F. Supp. 295, 298 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
,2 United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974).
' Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHA, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd on
rehearing, 519 F.2d 1215 (1975), cert. granted, 424 U.S. 964 (1976) (No. 75-746, 1976
Term).
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civil penalty is that it is flexible and does not burden the govern-
ment with a criminal action. Flexibility is crucial to the effective
administration of governmental programs. A commentator has
stated:
Civil money penalties provide an ideally flexible sanctioning
tool. In their absence, agency administrators often voice frustra-
tion at having to render harsh "all or nothing decisions" (e.g.,
in license revocation proceedings) when enforcement needs
would best be served by a more precise measurement of culpa-
bility and a more flexible response."
Historically, the monetary penalty has been used by govern-
ments as a device to punish wrongdoing. This penalty technique
is achieving new prominence today. The monetary penalty has
been refined as a sanction to enforce regulatory programs. Its
growth has been phenominal. The index to the United States Code
Service published by the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Com-
pany lists fifteen pages of references to Fines, Penalties and Forfei-
tures. More surprising is the 1975 pocket supplement which lists
in fine print two more pages of recent fines. Apparently the con-
gressional rule is to enforce new statutes with penalties; however,
the use of the monetary penalty is growing with little systematic
congressional inquiry into the effectiveness of the penalty sanc-
tion.5
In addition to the creation of new programs with civil mone-
tary sanctions, Congress has relabelled some existing criminal
monetary penalties as civil. Apparently, Congress believes that
civil monetary penalties are more effective than criminal penalties.
Possibly this trend is based upon the doctrinal perception that
violations of environmental or health regulations are mala
prohibita since no crime would exist except for the specific statute.
Even though the regulatory offense may be very offensive to society
it is not mala in se since the act is not considered inherently
wicked. This view of regulatory violators clearly would justify the
use of civil remedies to deter violations. In the future, however,
"1 Goldschmid, Harvey J., An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of
Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, 2
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIvE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 896, 898 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Goldschmid Report].
'1 Id. at 896.
[Vol. 79
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pollution, health and safety violations may be viewed as inherently
wicked."
Another reason for the trend toward civil penalties is not
based on the nature of the offense, but based instead on a desire
to avoid the problems inherent in criminal law. The rationale here
is that the polluter's offense is not to be treated as a traditional
crime but as a civil infraction of the law. This is done even though
strong arguments can be made that the act is criminal." The in-
creased demands of procedural due process, the high standard of
proof, the right to counsel and the myraid other protections af-
forded to accused criminals stand in the way of effective enforce-
ment of criminal penalties."
Criminal prosecutions present many obstacles to the adminis-
trator. The rights granted a criminal defendant far exceed those
granted a defendant in civil litigation. In a criminal penalty case,
the defendant has full procedural due process, the right to a speedy
trial and the benefit of a higher standard of proof to be met by the
prosecution. The protections of the fourth and fifth amendments
do not apply as fully to a civil action as they do to a criminal
action. As will be shown later, the application of these criminal
rights to civil penalty actions would greatly limit the effectiveness
of the civil monetary penalty as a sanction.
A final reason for the trend toward civil monetary penalties is
inherent in the nature of the administrative process. There is grave
doubt that an administrative agency has the authority to deter-
mine the criminal guilt or innocence of an individual. The present
procedure requires criminal monetary penalty cases to be pro-
cessed through the Department of Justice. This arrangement is
unsatisfactory from the agency point of view because, historically,
the Department of Justice has not prosecuted adminstrative cases
with zeal." All of the above factors have resulted in a trend toward
civil monetary penalties as the major sanction in achieving compli-
ance with congressional policy.
"1 Schwenk, Edmund H., The Administrative Crime, Its Creation and Punish-
ment by Administrative Agencies, 42 MICH. L. REv. 51, 52 (1943). See also, Gold-
schmid Report at 914.
1" Often business personnel are fined during proceedings which afford the viola-
tor of the regulation significantly fewer rights than those given a person accused of
a traditional criminal offense.
i' See Goldschmid Report at 916.
, Id. at 923.
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While this article will emphasize monetary penalties, it is
important to note at the outset the diverse sanctions available to
Congress in devising, enforcement provisions for regulatory pro-
grams. Most statutes include at least one or more of these devices.
The first enforcement tool in the government arsenal is social
approbation-the simple fact that law breakers are subject to cen-
sure from their fellow citizens. While this is not always the case,
as some experiences in the coal mining regions show,"0 the violation
of law is generally discouraged by fellow citizens. Agencies can use
this approbation as an effective tool to achieve enforcement by
publicizing an individual's wrongdoing. This places social pressure
on the offender to conform to congressional dictates."
The next device frequently used is the injunction with its com-
panion contempt citation. The injunction compels, by way of court
order, compliance with the statute or regulations. The injunctive
action grants the administrator flexibility of action.
The injunction directly focuses on the prevention of future pol-
lution, avoiding the inflexibility of some other sanctions that
look to punishment of past acts. In dealing with future acts, a
court may develop the best course of action by balancing the
various equities in light of the public policy issues involved.
Injunctive relief may thus be tailored to bring a polluter into
compliance with environmental laws over a period of time when
the situation so warrants.2
There are, of course, drawbacks to the injunctive remedy. One
drawback is delay. Often injunctions require an inordinate amount
of time before a hearing is set. Also, layers of bureaucratic delay
are inherent in the process of agency referral to the Department of
Justice and the referral to the United States Attorney's Office. An
agency as a rule cannot act on its own. 23 However, immediate and
2 In some areas of Pennsylvania and Kentucky, groups of small coal mine
operators have refused to cooperate in the enforcement of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969. Some mine operators have received publicity for
their defiance of the law.
21 The vast majority of mine operators have complied with the law and have
made efforts to comply with the health and safety regulations.
2 Marshall, David W., Environmental Protection and the Role of the Civil
Money Penalty: Some Practical and Legal Considerations, 4 ENv. Air. No. 2, 323
(1975) [hereinafter referred to as Environmental Affairs).
1 Injunction actions under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969 must be processed through the Department of Justice and then referred to the
[Vol. 79
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irreparable damage to the environment can be restrained by use
of a temporary restraining order. The temporary restraining order
is often provided by statute along with the injunctive remedy. 
2
Another weakness is the fact that injunctions only enjoin future
violations. Past violations go without punishment.2 Finally, as the
Reserve Mining Co. v. United States case 6 shows, courts are ex-
tremely reluctant to shut down an offending polluter or violator.
Another remedy available is license or permit revocation. This
remedy is used extensively by the Army Corps of Engineers in
enforcing certain sanctions of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act.? License or permit revocation normally occurs when a holder
of a license or permit granted by an agency refuses to comply with
an agency rule or regulation. The agency, in order to compel com-
pliance,, issues what has been called an "economic death sent-
ence." 2' Although effective, license revocation is limited.
Those concerned about agency sanctions, like military plan-
ners, have sometimes only belatedly realized that the capacity
for "massive retaliation" (e.g., the capacity to render an eco-
nomic death sentence by license revocation, or by denials of
contracts or grants) should be complemented by the ability to
render a more precise (in terms of measuring culpability) and
flexible response. Agency administrators indicate that there is
often demonstrable need for a wider range of sanctioning
power.
219
A final enforcement sanction provided by Congress is the Qui
Tam"' action or the right of a private party to maintain an action
to enforce a statute. Qui Tam actions have been used to goad
appropriate United States Attorney's Office. The average delay from date of the
violation to date of hearing is six months.
24 30 U.S.C. § 818 (1970) provides both temporary restraining orders and pre-
liminary injunctions for violations of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
of 1969. A similar provision for the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act
is found at 30 U.S.C. §§ 721 et seq. (1966).
No penalties have ever been collected under the Federal Metal and Nonme-
tallic Mine Safety Act although some injunctions have been issued.
25 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26
N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
2 33 U.S.C. § 412.
Goldschmid Report at 908.
29 Id.
30 "Qui Tam" is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hac parts sequitur, which means "who sues on behalf of the
King as well as for himself."
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agencies into action. Although Qui Tam actions have been brought
by citizens, courts have refused to allow citizen enforcement of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.1' Section 411 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act provides that one half of fines assessed against viola-
tors of Section 407 shall, at the discretion of the Court, be paid to
the person or persons giving information which leads to the convic-
tion. The Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,3"
stated by way of dicta that informers' actions were a well-
established part of the American legal system. Still, the effective-
ness of Qui Tam actions has been largely undermined by courts
which construe Section 413 of the 1899 Act as giving the Justice
Department exclusive authority to enforce this Act.3 The final
result has been that Qui Tam actions are largely ineffectual.
The enforcement tools discussed above are largely being sup-
planted by civil and criminal monetary penalties. These sanctions
provide the needed flexibility that the others lack. The monetary
penalty offers an administrator all the flexibility needed to enforce
complicated and far-flung legislative programs. It is the effective-
ness of these penalties that will be focused upon in the remainder
of this article.
II. ANALYSIS OF MONETARY PENALTIES
A. Types of Monetary Penalties
There are two types of monetary penalties-the civil penalty
and the criminal penalty. Each type may be broken down into an
individual penalty and a corporate penalty.
A civil penalty is normally defined as a penalty which is char-
acterized by Congress as civil and which imposes a fine only to
enforce a remedial statute.34 Unless specifically stated in the stat-
ute, a civil penalty applies to the entity violating the statutory
requirements. Therefore, the penalty can be imposed on the part-
nership or corporation as an entity without special proof of busi-
ness status. Individual civil penalties normally apply when spe-
cial acts are committed by an individual. The penalty, therefore,
' 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1899).
: 317 U.S. 537 (1943), reh. den. 318 U.S. 799 (1943).
33 U.S.C. § 413 provides that the Department of Justice shall "conduct the
legal proceedings necessary to enforce the foregoing provisions" of the Act.
' Civil penalties are also known as civil forfeitures or civil money penalties.
3 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(1) (1970) provides for the imposition of a civil penalty on
the operator of a coal mine who violates a mandatory health or safety standard.
[Vol. 79
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is imposed on the person regardless of the business status of the
employer. Often individual penalties are assessed for willful con-
duct while civil penalties are imposed on the corporation for the
conduct regardless of knowledge.
37
Criminal penalties, of course, run the gamut from the fine
imposed by a judge for the commission of a traditional crime to
penalties imposed for the willful or gross disregard of a regulation
imposed by statute. The distinctions between a civil and criminal
penalty become vague when willful conduct is involved. However,
the criminal penalty has been imposed on individual and corporate
entity alike.
3 8
In discussing the monetary penalty, this article focuses on
enforcement of congressionally mandated policies and the mone-
tary penalty as a tool for forcing compliance. A civil penalty has a
"remedial" purpose and is used to encourage compliance, while a
criminal penalty is "punitive" and is used to punish wrongdoing.
This distinction has little effect on the person fined, since one
hundred dollars paid to the treasury affects him identically, re-
gardless of the punitive or remedial character of the fine. This
distinction is crucial, however, in determining the legal rights of
the defendant in challenging the penalty. 9
While it is clear that Congress has the authority to promote
the effective administration of its programs, great homage is paid
to the legal fiction that a particular fine may be classified as either
remedial, punitive, or a revenue-gathering device." Courts have
generally ignored the overlapping nature of the various types of
penalties.' Regardless of labels, a penalty may be imposed for
enforcement, remedial, and punitive purposes simultaneously.42
' 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(2) (1970) provides for a $250 civil penalty against any
miner who willfully violates the mandatory safety standards related to smoking.
30 U.S.C. § 819(c) (1970) provides for civil penalties against a corporate
officer who willfully refuses to comply with any order issued under the Coal Mine
Act.
. The criminal penalty is increasingly being used as a backup to civil penal-
ties. The criminal penalty must then be assessed against the same person as the
civil penalty, leaving only the severity of conduct as the determining factor in the
choice of the sanction.
11 Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd on rehearing, 519 F.2d 1215 (1975), cert. granted,
424 U.S. 964 (1976) (No. 75-748, 1976 Term).
4' See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
' Goldschmid Report at 914 to 916.
42 Id.
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The basic rationale for all monetary penalties regardless of label
is to eliminate the incentive to pollute, violate a health or safety
standard, or violate some other congressionally established policy.
B. Administrative Imposition of Penalties
A further trend in the monetary penalty field is toward the
administrative imposition of penalties. Under this system, penal-
ties are imposed and collected by the agency itself with little court
interference. De novo review of the agency's penalty by federal
courts is sharply curtailed.43 The rationale for this further step
away from traditional jurisprudence lies in the nature of the civil
penalty itself.
This result (i.e., the imposition of money penalties for regu-
latory offenses without an alleged offender being afforded safe-
guards surrounding criminal prosecutions) may be justified on
the following grounds:
(i) only money is at stake;
(ii) civil penalties for "malum prohibitum" offenses do
not open an alleged offender to the disgrace and other
disabilities associated with criminal conviction; and
(iii) at times, the penalty may indeed roughly approxi-
mate a proportionate reimbursement for monies lost (or
damages suffered) by the government and/or for the cost
of the enforcement system."
The trend toward administrative imposition of civil monetary
penalties is clearly a creature of necessity. Without some attenua-
tion of the bundle of legal rights available to the defendant, the
growth of the civil penalty as a tool of enforcement would cease.
Given the practical necessity for the civil penalty, a strong basis
exists for justifying administrative imposition without a full scale
judicial hearing.
One commentator has suggested that administrative imposi-
tion of monetary penalties would provide the following advantages
over the present system with de novo review by federal courts:
1. Cases which now languish on judicial dockets could be ad-
judicated quickly, efficiently and at relatively low cost.
Id. at 936-47. This method is advocated by Professor Goldschmid as a means
of avoiding the negative effects of the de novo review approach to civil penalty
assessments.
" Id. at 915.
[Vol. 79
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2. Unwise settlement (from the standpoint of the public's in-
terest in deterring or remedying violations of regulatory laws)
would be avoided by eliminating the inhibitions on agencies
created by the unavailability of (or inappropriateness of taking
a case to) overburdened courts. Concomitantly, the availability
of a forum should temper administrative inclinations towards
arbitrariness.
3. Dual and overlapping efforts by an agency and the Depart-
ment of Justice would be eliminated.
4. There would no longer be an opportunity for recalcitrant
defendants (who now will not settle and cannot easily be
brought to trial) to escape the consequences of their improper
acts.
5. An alleged offender would, at his or her option, be provided
with procedural protections and an impartial forum in which to
present a defense. No such forum or protection is available as
a practical (as opposed to theoretical) matter now.
6. Fair settlements should be facilitated since neither the
agency nor the alleged offender would be able to premise obstin-
acy on the inability or unwillingness of the other to go to court.
7. Cases which are simply inappropriate (e.g., because of their
dollar magnitude and the expertise involved) would be removed
from federal district courts at a time when there is general
agreement that we "have poured more into the courts than they
can digest." As Judge Hufstedler recently said, "We have
tended to treat every case, whatever its genesis and whatever
its dimension, as if it warranted meticulous discovery, several
bouts of pleading, a pretrial conference, a 12-man jury, full
throttle adversary proceedings, and a few reruns. . . .We can
no longer indulge ourselves in those luxurious assumptions.
8. Substantial evidence review would be available in the
courts of appeals as an ultimate (though presumably seldom
used) protection against abuse. 5
The Supreme Court has provided a rationale in support of this
position. In Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting,46 the Court held that
the administrative imposition of a monetary penalty was valid
although no de novo review in federal court was provided by the
Immigration Act of 1924. The Court, in allowing the administra-
tive imposition of penalties, noted congressional limitations:
• . .the statute imposing the fines must be regarded as an
incident to the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to
Id. at 928-29.
287 U.S. 329 (1932).
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control the admission of aliens, and due process of law does not
require that the courts, rather than administrative officers, be
charged, in any case, with determining the facts upon which the
imposition of such a fine depends. It follows that as the fines
are not invalid, however imposed, because unreasonable or con-
fiscatory in amount, which is conceded, Congress may choose
the administrative rather than the judicial method of imposing
them. 7
This concept of administrative imposition of civil penalties
may seem afoul of the seventh amendment right to a jury trial.
This issue is presently before the Supreme Court in Frank Irey, Jr.,
Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission."
Given this growing trend toward monetary penalties, what then is
the role of the criminal monetary penalty?
C. Criminal Monetary Penalties
At present, criminal penalties are increasingly being used as
a back-up to civil penalties. The threat of criminal penalty is being
reserved for recalcitrant violators of congressional programs. Once
the deterrent effect of a civil penalty is exhausted, criminal proce-
dures are then initiated by indictment. 9 As the use of the criminal
penalty is reduced, many of its administrative and procedural
faults pointed out in the Introduction are eliminated.
Since the criminal penalty is used sparingly, the Department
of Justice is not deluged with unimportant cases. The cases re-
ferred to it are serious and appropriate for criminal action."
Most importantly, the offense now committed by the defen-
dant is no longer malum prohibitum but takes on the nature of a
traditional malum in se crime. This provides both the Justice De-
partment and the courts with incentiveto prosecute. The offense
becomes major and serious and not merely one of many thousand
similar "technical" violations of the law.5'
,T Id. at 335.
, Note 39 supra. Oral argument was held on November 24, 1976.
" In practice, the criminal indictments under the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969 have been reserved only for the most flagrant violators. As
will be discussed later, all criminal indictments have been tied up in litigation.
There has only been limited success in the use of this remedy.
50 Environmental Affairs at 329.
1, Id. at note 41.
[Vol. 79
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One commentator, pointing out the ineffectiveness of wide-
spread use of criminal sanctions, stated:
The major defect in a system of criminal sanctions used to
enforce environmental laws is conceptual. The subject matter
of these and other health and safety laws is considered to be
malum prohibitum. The prohibited act is a crime not because
it is considered morally wrong, but merely because it has been
declared unlawful. Therefore, the real deterrent value of the
criminal sanction, the stigma of moral blame, is greatly re-
duced. The second difficulty is more practical. A great amount
of unlawful pollution is caused by corporations which, of course,
cannot be imprisoned. A monetary fine can only be effective
where it is greater than the cost of compliance. When imposed,
however, criminal fines have been very small, and have effected
no real deterrence.
52
After noting the lack of moral culpability attached to the unlawful
act, this commentator stresses that administrators and prose-
cutors are reluctant to invoke criminal sanctions, that jurors are
reluctant to find guilt, and that judges are reluctant to impose
strong penalties. 3
These problems are eliminated when the use of the criminal
penalty is reserved for more serious violations. The effectiveness of
the criminal penalty is enhanced by its use in conjunction with the
civil penalty.
Thus where no criminal intent is required, jury nullification and
related problems cripple the efficacy of the criminal sanction.
The sanction is appropriate, however, in cases involving de-
monstrably intentional, wanton, or reckless violations. Here,
some measure of moral culpability is involved and the sanction
may act as an effective deterrent. 5
IH. ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL VERSUS CRIMINAL PENALTY DISTINCTION
A. Overlapping Penalties
There is often a fine line between civil and criminal penalties.
Special types of civil penalties intended for the more serious of-
fender are indistinguishable from criminal penalties. These impose
increasingly higher fines for aggravated conduct. Problems have
52 Id. at 330.
3 Id. at 329.
11 Id. at 330.
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arisen as to the nature of this type of penalty. The individual civil
penalty is an example. Individual penalties are assessed against
the person or entity actually committing the offense, and are
clearly intended to punish a wrongdoer. Stiffer fines are imposed
for aggravated or willful misconduct.55 Some statutes provide for
cumulative penalties with the amount of the fine increasing with
each occurrence of the forbidden conduct. 6 These individual pen-
alties clearly approach criminal sanctions, and it is in this area
that courts look closely to see whether the procedural and due
process requirements of the Constitution are met. This area is the
battleground for challenges to civil monetary penalties."
B. Civil Versus Criminal Penalty
Clearly, as monetary penalties become more prevalent and
substantial, the traditional distinctions between civil and criminal
fines will be opened to searching challenge. Historically both civil
and criminal penalties have been used as a sanction in American
law. Court decisions in the early 1900's approved the civil sanction
device. As government regulation began to grow, courts began
modifying the rules concerning civil sanctions and eventually
reached the present state of law, whereby a court in determining
the nature of a monetary penalty will analyze the congressional
motive. The extent of this trend will determine the effectiveness
of civil penalties as a sanction. The more rights granted a defen-
dant in a civil penalty action, the less effective that sanction will
be.
The distinction as to whether or not a monetary fine is im-
posed as a civil or criminal penalty often involves a question of the
intent of the agency imposing the penalty. One author noted:
The problem of distinction between criminal and civil sanctions
is further heightened by the difficulty in determining whether
monetary fines are imposed as criminal or civil sanctions. Pre-
sumably, an administrative agency can assess and collect a fine
so long as it is not an exercise of criminal jurisdiction. On the
other hand, "civil procedure is incompatible with the accepted
'5 See 30 U.S.C. § 819(b) and (c) (1970).
5' 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(1) (1970).
' In recent individual civil penalty actions against Finley Coal Company, the
mine operator has challenged the civil nature of penalties under 30 U.S.C. § 819(c).
Criminal actions were brought against Finley Coal Company in United States v.
Finley Coal Company, 493 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1974).
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rules and constitutional guarantees of power governing the trial
of criminal prosecutions." But even that statement, incontesta-
bly sound as a generalization of constitutional principle, was no
more than dictum in the case in which the recitation was
made. 8
In a statement invariably quoted by opponents of civil penal-
ties, Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed dismay at the "dialectical
subtleties" of distinguishing between civil and criminal penalties.58
In 1908 the Supreme Court unequivocally held that the mere
fact that a statute provides for a penalty does not make the statute
a criminal provision." The Court held that provisions of "An Act
to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States,"
which imposed monetary penalties on a steamship company for
importing aliens afflicted with a loathsome or dangerous conta-
gious disease were constitutional. The steamship company as-
serted that this civil penalty was actually criminal in nature and
did not differ substantially from the criminal fines and jail terms
provided in other sections of the Act. The Court, in noting this
objection, stated:
In accord with this settled judicial construction the legislation
of Congress from the beginning, not only as to tariff, but as to
internal revenue, taxation, and other subjects, has proceeded on
the conception that it was within the competency of Congress,
when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to
impose appropriate obligations, and sanction their enforcement
by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the
power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invok-
ing the judicial power.'
Since the authority of Congress to bring aliens into the United
States "embraces every conceivable aspect of that subject"62 it
follows that the method devised by Congress to enforce that Act is
constitutional.
Probably the most important aspect of this decision is the fact
that it is limited to Congress' unquestioned control over the entry
58 McKay, Robert B., Sanctions in Motion: The Administrative Process, 49
IOWA L. REv. 441, 444 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
11 United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943) (concurring
opinion).
0 Oceanic Steam Navigation Company v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1908).
"Id. at 339.
" Id. at 340.
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of aliens. 3 Since most new civil penalty statutes are based on the
authority of Congress over interstate commerce, the authority of
Congress will change as Supreme Court interpretations of the com-
merce clause fluctuate.6
In United States v. Regan,5 the Supreme Court held that
defendant's violation of Section 4 of the Alien Immigration Act of
1907 need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt in an
action of debt brought by the United States to recover the amount
of the penalty assessed for the violation, since the action was civil
in nature. In an apparent attempt to lay to rest challenges to the
penalty provision of the Alien Immigration Act, the Court engaged
in a detailed discussion of the history of monetary penalties.
The Court noted that its decision in Stockwell v. United
States" established the right of the government to sue in a civil
action as any other plaintiff. In Stockwell the Court stated:
[B]ut it is insisted that when the government proceeds for a
penalty based on an offense against law, it must be by indict-
ment or by information. No authority has been adduced in sup-
port of this position, and it is believed that none exists. It can-
not be that whether an action of debt is maintainable or not
depends upon the question who is the plaintiff. Debt lies when-
ever a sum certain is due to the plaintiff, or a sum which can
readily be reduced to a certainty-a sum requiring no future
valuation to settle its amount. It is not necessarily founded
upon contract. It is immaterial in what manner the obligation
was incurred, or by what it is evidenced, if the sum owing is
capable of being definitely ascertained."
In United States v. Zucker," the Court held that the defen-
dant had no rights under the sixth amendment of the Constitution
in an action by the United States to recover a debt.
The defendant, in such a case, is no more entitled to be con-
fronted at the trial with the witnesses of the plaintiff than he
would be in a case where the evidence related to a claim for
Id.
' A more narrow interpretation of the commerce powers of Congress will re-
strict federal jurisdiction over small polluters or violators of health and safety
standards. See Morton v. Ralph Bloom, 373 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
232 U.S. 37 (1914).
" 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871).
'7 Id. at 542.
" 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
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money that could be established without disclosing any facts
tending to show the commission of crime. 9
The view expressed by the Court in both Stockwell" and
Zucker7 l is that the action brought by the government would be a
civil action if brought by any other party. The rationale for this
view is that a civil action is the same regardless of whether the
United States government or a private party brings it. As long as
the debt is a fixed sum, the Court will not look behind the debt;
instead, the action in debt will be treated as a civil action, and the
debtor will have no additional rights because the debt was incurred
against the United States. The Court did point out, however, that
Congress could grant the debtor increased rights if it so chose.
It must be taken as settled law that a certain sum, or a sum
which can readily be reduced to a certainty, prescribed in a
statute as a penalty for the violation of law, may be recovered
by civil action, even if it may also be recovered in a proceeding
which is technically criminal. Of course, if the statute by which
the penalty was imposed contemplated recovery only by a crim-
inal proceeding, a civil remedy could not be adopted.
72
The court in United States v. Regan73 then summarized its
position, stating:
It is a necessary conclusion from these cases (1) that, as respects
a pecuniary penalty for the commission of a public offense,
Congress competently may authorize, and in this instance has
authorized, the enforcement of such penalty by either a crimi-
nal prosecution or a civil action; (2) that the present action is a
civil one and appropriate under the statute; and (3) that, if not
directed otherwise, such an action is to be conducted and deter-
mined according to the same rules and with the same incidents
as are other civil actions.
74
This decision represents the most extreme view of the Su-
preme Court. The more recent decisions have backed away from
this position. In these later opinions the Supreme Court has begun
to look behind the civil action to determine if in reality it is civil;
however, civil penalty provisions have been upheld by the Su-
£ Id. at 481.
" 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871).
71 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
7 232 U.S. 37, 43 (1914).
- 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
71 Id. 46-47.
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preme Court. How far this trend will go is uncertain. Increasing
governmental regulation may tempt the Court to look more closely
at these "civil" actions in an effort to restrain governmental regu-
lation.
In Trop v. Dulles,75 the government urged that the provision
of the Nationality Act of 1940 which provided for the loss of nation-
ality, citizenship, or loss of political rights by reason of desertion
committed in time of war was a civil sanction and therefore the full
constitutional guarantees applicable to criminal defendants were
not needed in order to deprive a deserter of citizenship. In rejecting
the government's contention, the Court stated:
How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudiction
and of law generally if specific problems could be solved by
inspection of the labels pasted on them! . . .Doubtless even a
clear legislative classification of a statute as "non-penal" would
not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute. 6
The Court noted that even the views of the Cabinet Committee
and of the Congress itself as to the nature of the statute were
equivocal and could not possibly provide the answer. The standard
to be applied by the Court was that of "careful consideration.""
In carefully considering the nature of the penalty, the Court
looked to the purpose of the statute and not merely to congres-
sional intent alone.
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has gener-
ally based its determination upon the purpose of the statute. If
the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punish-
ment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others,
etc.-it has been considered penal. But a statute has been con-
sidered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but
to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose.
The Court has recognized that any statute decreeing some ad-
versity as a consequence of certain conduct may have both a
penal and a nonpenal effect. The controlling nature of such
statutes normally depends on the evident purpose of the legisla-
ture.78
The existence of a regulatory purpose in conjunction with the
Is 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
76 356 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1958).
77 Id. at 95.
n Id. at 96.
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punitive purpose will not save the civil nature of the remedy."
Therefore, the mere recitation that a penalty is imposed for reme-
dial purposes will not save it as a civil remedy if the Court in
examining the purposes of the legislation determines that there are
also punitive goals. This distinction is often a narrow one in the
case of monetary fines.
In another case, the New Jersey District Court looked to the
wording of the statute to determine the nature of the penalty.
Here, the defendant refused to be fingerprinted upon pleading
guilty to seven charges of the Motor Carriers Chapter of the Inter-
state Commerce Act and urged that the fines imposed were not
criminal in nature, and therefore the United States Marshal was
without authority to fingerprint him.8 The New Jersey District
Court, in rejecting this argument, noted that while the statute
itself was silent as to the nature of the penalty, the language of the
statute, which referred to "offenses" and "conviction", indicated
the intent of Congress to impose criminal monetary penalties.8 '
In the landmark decision of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,8 2
the Supreme Court attempted to summarize the growing body of
law surrounding the civil versus criminal penalty controversy.
Here the Court held unconstitutional the sections of the National-
ity Act of 1940 and the Immigration and Nationality Act which
deprived wartime deserters of their citizenship for leaving or re-
maining outside the United States at time of war or national emer-
gency for the purpose of evading the military service. The defen-
dant urged that the statute was defective because the full proce-
dural safeguards guaranteed to criminal defendants by the fifth
and sixth amendments of the Constitution were not granted to him
since the sanction was styled as a civil action. The Court rejected
the contentions of the government that the punishment was civil
in nature and focused on the difficulties in determining the nature
of the penalty.
The punitive nature of the sanction here is evident under the
tests traditionally applied to determine whether an Act of Con-
gress is penal or regulatory in character, even though in other
cases this problem has been extremely difficult and elusive of
' Id. at 98-99.
SO United States v. Krapf, 180 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1960).
" Id. at 889.
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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solution. Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disabil-
ity or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behav-
ior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alter-
native purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may
often point in differing directions."'
These seven factors are only to be considered absent conclu-
sive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a
statute. These factors are to be considered in relation to the statute
on its face. Since the facts at hand clearly manifested congres-
sional intent to punish, the provisions of the statutes involved were
held to be criminal in nature and violative of the Constitution.
This decision thus establishes a two-part test. First, it must
be determined if there is conclusive evidence of congressional in-
tent to establish punitive sanctions. If so, then the court need go
no further. If the answer is negative, the seven-part test is applied.
The next question must be, what is conclusive evidence of
congressional intent? Justice Stewart in his dissent was not con-
vinced of the punitive intent of Congress:
It seems clear to me that these putative indicia of punitive
intent are far overbalanced by the fact that this legislation dealt
with a basic problem of wartime morale reaching far beyond
concern for any individual affected."
The overlapping nature of the two-part test has allowed lower
courts to look behind the congressional statement of purpose and
apply the seven-part test to determine whether the courts should
allow full criminal rights in each instance. The Court in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinezu has opened the door to scrutiny of the un-
derlying purposes of congressional actions. Moreover, it is conceiv-
able that a court will declare a civil remedy illegal in order to stem
the growth of government regulation.
A close look at how the courts have interpreted this decision
is appropriate. In Telephone News System, Inc. v. Illinois Bell
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Telephone Company," plaintiff sought to enjoin the Illinois Bell
Telephone Company from discontinuing service under statutes for-
bidding the use of telephone service for the purpose of transmitting
or receiving illegal gambling information. Illinois Bell Telephone
Company had notified plaintiff of its intent to discontinue tele-
phone service at the request of the Justice Department. The trial
court granted a temporary injunction and, during the hearing on
the merits, plaintiff asserted that the statute providing for dis-
connection of telephone service authorized the prosecution of a
crime under the guise of a civil remedy. In rejecting this position,
the appellate court stressed that the mere fact that a sanction is
conditioned upon criminal behavior does not conclusively deter-
mine the question of whether a provision is penal or not. Further-
more, the deprivation of property is insufficient to establish the
nature of the sanction involved. The Court looked exclusively to
the legislative history:
The governing inquiry on the issue of the civil or penal character
of a provision is whether the legislative aim in providing the
sanction was to punish the individual for engaging in the activ-
ity involved or to regulate the activity in question. 8
The Court found here that the legislative history in no way
suggested that Congress intended that the discontinuation of tele-
phone service be a penalty for the violation of a criminal statute.
The aim of the statute was merely "to curtail professional gam-
bling activities"8 by depriving those engaged in such activities of
rapid communications facilities.
Even though the legislative history was clear, the Court appar-
ently felt compelled to apply the Supreme Court test for cases
when the legislative history is not clear:
[lt is appropriate to note summarily, however, that the dis-
continuation of telephone service is not an "affirmative disabil-
ity or restraint"; it is not historically regarded as punishment;
it is not meant to promote retribution and deterrent, [sic] but
to prevent the continued use of communications to facilitate
professional gambling activities; it has an "alternative pur-
pose" and does not appear to be excessive in relation to that
purpose."
* 220 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
* Id. at 630.
* Id.
11 Id. at 631.
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Once the legislative history has been found to indicate that
Congress intended a criminal sanction, the Court's inquiry is
ended even though the terms of the statute are silent." Once there
is unmistakable evidence of punitive intent, the sanction is crimi-
nal.
Each sanction must be judged on a case-by-case basis with the
final determination turning on the particular context involved.
The rationale established in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez9' is
not all-inclusive. Flexibility is needed because of the large number
of monetary and nonmonetary penalties that are imposed. The
unique circumstances of each penalty must be considered by a
court. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlas
Roofing Company v. O6cupationa S. & H. Rev. Com'n.,92 applied
in detail the seven-part test of the Supreme Court and held that a
civil penalty assessed under the Occupational Health and Safety
Act was civil in nature since, taken as a whole, the seven-part test
of the Supreme Court as applied to the facts demonstrated that
Congress meant to regulate and not reprimand. The trend of courts
in analyzing civil penalties is definitely toward the type of detailed
analysis applied in this case.
In summary, a court when faced with the determination of
whether a monetary penalty is civil or criminal in nature, must
make a threshold inquiry as to the congressional intent. If strong
congressional intent to impose a civil remedy is apparent, the dis-
trict courts are bound to treat the penalty as civil. While Congress
cannot, of course, subvert the criminal justice system, Congress
can attempt to use civil remedies and thereby avoid many of the
burdensome requirements of the criminal law. If the court deter-
mines that the legislative history is unclear, then the seven criteria
outlined by the Supreme Court must be considered. Trial courts
have determined that this procedure be applied on a case-by-case
basis. There is a great opportunity here for the striking down of
civil penalties.
Courts in looking at a civil penalty assessment are required to
substantially limit the procedural and substantive rights of a de-
fendant once it is determined that the penalty is civil in nature. A
20 United States v. Futura, 339 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
See note 82.
02 Atlas Roofing Company, Inc. v. Occupational S. & H. Rev. Com'n, 518 F.2d
990 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted 424 U.S. 964 (1976) (No. 75-748, 1976 Term).
[Vol. 79
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trial judge may view this loss of rights as harsh. A close look at the
rights a defendant loses once the penalty is declared "civil" is
important. The loss of procedural rights is significant.
D. Summary of Affected Procedural Rights
One author establishes eight categories of rights which are
denied to a defendant once a finding is made by a court that the
penalties imposed are civil. This loss of procedural rights is espe-
cially important when considered in the light of what often
amounts to a fictional difference between civil and criminal penal-
ties.
Civil penalties have been enacted to deny defendants the pro-
tections normally afforded in criminal prosecutions. However,
the courts still have not determined which rights enjoyed by
criminal defendants may be dispensed with in civil prosecu-
tions. Indeed, there is authority to support both the grant and
denial of a number of important rights to civil defendants. Pros-
ecutors often are unsure of the stance they are to take in civil
penalty cases, and the alert defendant should assert each right
separately in order to assure himself the maximum in protec-
tions and the greatest delay. 3
The determination that a penalty is civil limits the jury rights
available to a defendant. A defendant in a criminal action absent
a knowing waiver, clearly has a right to a jury trial. This is not the
case in an action involving a civil penalty. The seventh amend-
ment9 does provide a right to a jury trial in civil cases where the
right existed at common law and where the amount in controversy
exceeds twenty dollars. This procedure has been effectively cir-
cumvented. Courts have held that administrative findings can be
the basis for the assessment of civil penalties. 5 The penalties ad-
ministratively determined are then enforceable in federal district
court in a civil action. Often review in district court is limited to
the substantial evidence test."
Another limitation is the lack of the right to confront one's
accusor. In civil penalty actions the defendant does not enjoy this
right. Depositions of absent witnesses are sufficient as evidence,
Constitutional Protections in Civil Penalty Cases at 483.
U.S. Const. Amend. VII.
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 (1938). This issue is now before the
Supreme Court in Frank Irey Inc. v. Usery, see, note 39.
" Constitutional Protections in Civil Penalty Cases at 483-84.
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and the penalty can be assessed without the presence of the defen-
dant."'
The fifth amendment provides: "Nor shall any person be sub-
ject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
".., This prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply
when one penalty is styled criminal and the other styled civil even
though both arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. As a
general rule, a person acquitted or convicted of a criminal charge
can be subjected to a civil penalty for the same acts involved in
the criminal action." This aspect of civil penalties is currently
under strong challenge in United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing
Co. ,00 The LeBeouf decision and briefs will be discussed in a later
section. This loss of double jeopardy protection appears harsh,
though technically justifiable.''
The standard of proof required to assess a civil penalty against
a defendant is much lower than that required in a criminal case.
The due process clause requires that the prosecution in a crimi-
nal proceeding prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In suits
to enforce civil penalties, however, the prosecution need prove
a violation of the statute only by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.
02
Administrative cases have even required defendants to sustain the
burden of proof even though the penalty was assessed by the gov-
ernment. This is full circle from traditional cases.' 3
The exclusionary rule which prohibits the use of illegally ob-
tained evidence in the furtherance of a criminal prosecution may
7 Id. at 485. Civil penalties are often assessed under the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969 through default proceedings in which no testimony
from any party is taken. The order of assessment is based solely on the record.
90 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
" Constitutional Protections in Civil Penalty Cases, at 485. See also One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); Coffey v.
United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
10 377 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 537 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976).
101 Id. The LeBeouf decision presents an ideal format for the Supreme Court
to restrict the use of dual penalties.
' Constitutional Protections in Civil Penalty Cases at 487.
' Id. at 487-88. See also Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Board of Mine Opera-
tions Appeals, 523 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975). Here the Court of Appeals held that in
a proceeding to review an order of a federal mine inspector closing a mine, the mine
operator carried the ultimate burden of proof to show that the closure order was
improperly issued. The government only had to make a prima facie case.
[Vol. 79
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be applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings alike. While
the issue has not been met squarely, the Supreme Court, in One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,04 applied the exclusionary
rule in a forfeiture proceeding involving a motor vehicle.
The privilege against self-incrimination has been held applic-
able to civil penalty proceedings when the "civil" penalty is in
reality quasi-criminal. In the landmark decision of Boyd v. United
States,"'0 the Supreme Court found that the privilege was applica-
ble because of the quasi-criminal nature of the penalties sought to
be imposed and the fact that discovery of the requested informa-
tion could lead to a criminal prosecution thereby triggering the
fifth amendment privilege. However, no Supreme Court cases have
dealt with penalties which are clearly civil and without underlying
criminal sanctions. In one recent case, a district court held the
privilege against self-incrimination to be inapplicable in a civil
action because "[t]he possible incriminating effect is only with
respect to speculative, future acts of defendant."'' 6
The rule requiring narrow construction of criminal statutes
does not apply in civil penalty proceedings. This is of necessity,
since many broad regulatory statutes require flexible standards
which can be applied to individual entities. By necessity many of
these regulations are broad and occasionally vague. Words such as
"safe" and "adequate" are often applied." 7 Vague or overly broad
prohibitions, of course, deny a defendant adequate notice of the
potential offense. The Supreme Court has held that the doctrine
of narrow construction need not be applied in civil penalty cases
brought by the government.' 8 The Court left open, however, the
question of quasi-criminal penalties. In one prior case, Corporation
of Haverford College v. Reeher, °9 the Court narrowly construed a
statute providing administrative denial of aid to a student who
engaged in disruptive activities.
M 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
M 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
' Morton v. V. R. Hylton, Civil Action No. 75-4-414, (S.D. Tex. October 31,
1975).
I" Regulations promulgated under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969 by necessity rely on such general terms in order to allow maximum
flexibility for the federal mine inspector.
IO Mouring v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
' 329 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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E. Inconsistent Application of Rights in Civil Penalty Cases
At the present time, each individual fact situation determines
whether the procedural rights applicable to criminal actions are
applicable to civil penalty actions. There is no clear-cut dividing
of rights.
Even on the availability of individual procedural safeguards
there is split of authority. This confusion is a product of many
divergent theories which have been used to classify a proceeding
as criminal or civil. There is no unifying thread running through
either the theories or the cases in which they have been applied.
Consequently, it is virtually impossible to find any order in the
disparate treatment of defendants' rights. .... 'IQ
This lack of consistency on the part of courts regarding the applica-
bility of criminal procedure to civil penalty proceedings is detri-
mental to the future effectiveness of civil penalty proceedings."'
This is so because the primary purpose of civil penalties is to
increase the effectiveness of enforcement tools by avoiding the de-
lays and complications inherent in criminal proceedings. Each
additional right afforded a defendant detracts from the effective-
ness of the civil penalty as an enforcement tool. Each additional
procedural requirement acts as a roadblock to speedy enforcement.
This passion for efficient enforcement, while the mark of a good
administrator, may run afoul of the traditional relationship be-
tween the citizen and the government.
This same conflict is responsible for the inconsistency in the
decisions of courts. Courts are confronted by two basic forces when
adjudicating civil penalty cases. On the one hand, there is great
concern on the part of the bench with the overcriminalization of
the law and this has resulted in a desire to encourage civil proceed-
ings. This desire to encourage civil proceedings is on the other hand
balanced by an apprehension on the part of judges that civil penal-
ties are in reality criminal sanctions masquerading under the guise
of the term "civil." This apprehension is coupled with the tradi-
,, Constitutional Protections in Civil Penalty Cases at 491.
" In Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio
1973), the court upheld the right to inspect coal mines without a search warrant. A
Texas court in Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., Civil Action No. 5-75-5-CA
(E.D. Tex. 1976) construed the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA) to
require search warrants when objection is made to the OSHA inspections. The court
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tional dislike of increasingly widespread and complex governmen-
tal regulation in areas concerning the environment, the workplace,
and traditional business practices.12 This inconsistency regarding
the rights afforded defendants in civil proceedings could result in
the creation of a compromise form of proceeding. Future enforce-
ment actions although styled "civil" may be treated as quasi-
criminal proceedings. No longer would courts hold that the govern-
ment is just like any other plaintiff in a civil proceeding. There are
presently too many diverse enforcement actions, many of which
are civil in name only. The resulting compromise would allow the
application of different procedural standards in civil enforcement
proceedings than those applied in the more conventional civil
cases. This increase in rights would seriously affect the future of
civil penalty actions. There is tension between the rights of defen-
dants and efficient enforcement. The more procedural rights
granted a defendant, the more a civil penalty proceeding takes on
the characteristics found in a criminal action. The very incentive
for the civil penalty proceeding is reduced.
Two recent cases stand in the forefront of this controversy.
Each of these will be discussed in order to show the fluctuating
state of the law in this area.
F. Two Recent Civil Penalty Cases
In United States v. LeBeouf Brothers Towing Co.," 3 the dis-
trict court was confronted with a challenge to the civil monetary
penalty and immunity provisions of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA). The facts were not in dispute. On June 3,
1972, one of the vessels owned by LeBeouf spilled gasoline into the
Texas City harbor, a navigable water of the United States. Le-
Beouf notified the United States Coast Guard of the spill, thereby
gaining immunity from criminal prosecution under 33 U.S.C.A. §
1161 (b)(4) (1970). Subpart (b)(4) provides that any person in
charge of any vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility shall, as
soon as he has knowledge of any discharge of oil from such facility,
immediately notify the United States Government of such dis-
charge. Failure to immediately notify the government of the spill
"M The judicial districts containing the largest number of civil penalty cases
processed under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 are located
in the coal regions. These areas are traditionally conservative and unfriendly to
governmental regulation.
"1 377 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 537 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976).
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shall result in a fine or jail term. If notification is given, however,
immunity is granted to the notifying person. This immunity is
broad and applies to criminal cases. The Act provides:
Notification received pursuant to this paragraph or information
obtained by the exploitation of such notification shall not be
used against any such person in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury or for giving a false statement."'
Thereafter, the government proposed a three thousand dollar
penalty against LeBeouf under section (b)(5) of the Act for the
same oil spill. This penalty was described as a civil penalty. Con-
gress had provided:
Any owner or operator of any vessel, onshore facility, or offshore
facility from which oil is knowingly discharged in violation of
paragraph (2) of this subsection shall be assessed a civil penalty
by the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard
is operating of no more than $10,000 for each offense. . ..
The amount of the penalty was based on three criteria: (1) the
appropriateness of the penalty to the size of the business, (2) the
effect on the operator's ability to stay in business, and (3) the
gravity of the violation."' LeBeouf refused to pay any penalty and
the government brought a civil action to recover the penalty.
The defendant contended that the "civil" penalty was crimi-
nal and was therefore violative of the immunity provision in sec-
tion 1161(b)(4) of the FWPCA and of the fifth amendment of the
Constitution. The district court, in granting defendant LeBeouf's
motion for summary judgment, reasoned that the appropriate test
to apply in determining the regulatory or penal character of a
penalty is whether the legislative aim in providing the sanction
was to punish the individual or to regulate the activity in question.
Since the legislative history was unclear, the district court resorted
to the seven-part test of Mendoza-Martinez and summarized its
approach in finding that "[t]he real nature and intended objec-
tive of a statute must be unearthed to avoid Swiftonian-like de-
ceit. ' "1 7 The district court then stated that:
"1 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(b)(4) (1970).
33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(b)(5) (1970).
Id.
" United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558, 563 (E.D.
La. 1974), rev'd, 537 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976).
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At first blush, the paragraph here in question appears to be
nonpenal, especially in view of the purported "civil penalty"
that is assessed for the proscribed activity. But to be guided in
the interpretative process by such superficial implements as
word classification or legal jargon truly would be an analytical
pitfall in allowing form to replace substance."'
The district court was unable to find any legitimate governmental
purpose served by the civil penalty except to reprimand a wrong-
doer with a pecuniary penalty and decided that to sanction this
"backdoor procedure" would ignore the immunity provision in
subpart (b)(4). Moreover, the court went on to state:
. . . this statutory situation is the only determinable instance
where Congress has coupled a punitive, albeit denominated
"civil," sanction with a mandatory and criminally enforceable
self-notification procedure (the constitutional validity of such
procedure being protected by a statutory grant of immunity
conterminous with that of the Fifth Amendment), with the lat-
ter procedure invariably triggering imposition of the punitive
sanction. Regardless of how the Court classifies the paragraph
5 penalty, criminal or remedial, the result is the same: this type
of statutory operation is impermissible."'
To allow Congress to impose criminal penalties styled as
"civil" penalties would be allowing Congress to accomplish indi-
rectly what it cannot do directly, namely to impose a penalty on
an offender based upon information extracted under pain of pun-
ishment. This would be a clear violation of the protective guaran-
tees against self-incrimination provided for in the fifth amend-
ment. The Court found that the "civil" collection proceeding was
in reality quasi-criminal.
While the paragraph 5 proceeding is civil in form, it is, at mini-
mum, quasi-criminal in nature since any penalty authorized
pursuant to paragraph 5 is incurred by the commission of an
offense against the law, namely, violation of the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 .... 120
The significance of this decision is the recognition by the
Court of a "quasi-criminal" or "noncriminal" proceeding apart
from the normal "civil" label. A defendant in such a quasi-
"' Id. at 563.
'' Id. at 566.
120 Id.
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criminal proceeding clearly has fifth amendment rights and by
implication other rights afforded criminal defendants.
This decision was appealed, and although the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court, a summary of the positions taken in the
briefs is revealing. The government took the hard line, asserting
that a civil remedy is strictly civil with no additional rights flowing
to a defendant because of the enforcement aspects of the action.
In its appellant brief the government urged that:
The use of civil penalties to assure compliance with regulatory
statutes is a time-honored legislative device, which has been
used by the Congress in a number of recent environmental and
regulatory statutes.
The holdings in these cases, if affirmed, would call into
question the penalty provisions of these and other statutes.','
The government's brief then goes on to cite the numerous cases
allowing civil penalty actions.
The Appellee strongly urged that the penalty assessed was
actually criminal in nature even though labelled "civil". The
prime objective of the mandatory penalty of the FWPCA is puni-
tive even though remedial purposes are asserted. Appellee then
goes on to state:
The use of the term "civil penalty" in the FWPCA gives some
indication that Congress intended the sanction to be noncri-
minal. On the other hand, the use of the term "penalty" shows
clearly that Congress intended to impose punishment upon
those who spill oil into the navigable waters of the United
States.'2
Without specifically stating the premise, Appellee touched
upon the basic nature of the conflict-regardless of the label, it is
fundamentally unfair for the government to punish without giving
a defendant elemental due process. Appellee asserted that it is
fundamentally unfair to use information achieved under the guise
of immunity as the basis of a civil penalty. Since the issue was
presented to the Fifth Circuit in the "civil" versus "criminal"
format, the circuit court did not reach the ultimate issues pre-
"2 Brief of Appellant at 6, United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F.
Supp. 558 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 537 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976).
12 Brief of Appellee at 5, United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F.
Supp. 558 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 537 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976).
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sented, but focused instead on the "all or nothing" approach and
found for the government."'
A second recent civil penalty case has been decided by the
Third Circuit and is now before the Supreme Court. The Third
Circuit Court, when confronted with similar contentions, has
opted for the broad finding of a civil penalty and recognition that
once the "civil" label is established, no additional rights flow to
the defendant. The events leading to the Third Circuit decision
began in January 11, 1972, when an employee of Frank Irey, Jr.,
Inc., was killed when the side of a trench in which he was working
collapsed. A compliance officer of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) determined that a violation of the
OSHA regulations had occurred. After an administrative hearing,
Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. was found guilty of violating the OSHA stan-
dards and assessed a $5,000 civil penalty. The Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission affirmed the lower tribunal and
Frank Irey, Jr., Inc., petitioned for review to the Third Circuit. The
court in Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission,' summarized petitioner's challenge:
The petitioner has chosen to attack the constitutionality of the
Act on a variety of bases, asserting that the enforcement proce-
dures involve an unlawful delegation of power to the executive
branch and that the penalties, though denominated civil, are in
fact criminal in nature. Some of the procedures to which the
petitioner objects, that is, the power of the Commission to in-
crease a proposed penalty, the vagueness of the general duty
section, an employer's Sixth Amendment [sic] right to be con-
fronted with his accusers, and the imposition of penalties pend-
ing determination of an appeal, are not involved in this case,
and consequently, we will not decide them."'
Petitioner further alleged that for a corporation, the "criminal"
penalties are identical to the civil penalties for "willful" violations,
and concluded that since the civil penalties did not afford the
defendant the rights guaranteed by the fourth, fifth, sixth and
seventh amendments to criminal defendants, they were unconsti-
tutional.
"'Id. at 19.
IU 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), affd on rehearing, 519 F.2d 1215 (1975), cert.
granted, 424 U.S. 964 (1976) (No. 75-746, 1976 Term).
1' Id. at 1203.
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The Third Circuit, in rejecting petitioner's argument, recog-
nized that there was "force and logic" in those arguments but
stated that the Supreme Court has held in a series of decisions that
Congress has a wide range of alternatives available to it for enforc-
ing its legislative policy. Conceding the punitive aspects of the
"civil" penalties, the court stated:
In the case sub judice, candor compels us to concede that the
punitive aspects of the OSHA penalties, particularly for a
"willful" violation, are far more apparent than any "remedial"
features. However, a deliberate and conscious refusal to abate
a harzardous condition may bring about a situation where a
heavy civil penalty might be needed to effect compliance with
safety standards. In any event, we have now come too far down
the road to hold that a civil penalty may not be assessed to
enforce observance of legislative policy.'
The Court remanded to the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission with instructions for the Commission to give
a restrictive definition to the term "willful". The process of assess-
.ing civil penalties was upheld.
Dissenting, Circuit Judge Gibbons reluctantly agreed that the
civil penalty provisions in OSHA fall within the parameters deline-
ated in the well known Supreme Court cases. However, this did not
dispose of petitioner's right to a jury trial under the seventh
amendment. In Judge Gibbons' opinion, there clearly was a civil
jury trial guarantee. On remand the court carefully considered this
seventh amendment argument and rejected it, stating:
Our function is not to pass upon either the wisdom or desirabil-
ity of such an administrative adjudicatory process. We are lim-
ited to deciding whether it is constitutional within the limita-
tions set by the Supreme Court.12
These two cases are part of a trend of continuing challenges
to the monetary civil penalty system. The Supreme Court is now
faced with this issue. Although defendants are continually assert-
ing the unconstitutionality of the civil penalty system, none has
yet asserted the need for the creation of the noncriminal or quasi-
criminal proceeding.
'2 Id. at 1204.
"2 Id. at 1219.
[Vol. 79
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IV. Two CONTRASTING PENALTY STATUTES
Now that the legal framework surrounding monetary sanc-
tions has been explored, this framework will be applied to two
specific mine safety statutes. The Federal Metal and Nonmetallic
Mine Safety Act'2 will be contrasted with the controversial Fed-
eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.129
This comparison will facilitate a determination of the effec-
tiveness of civil penalties, since both Acts are similar in that they
are enforced by the same agency and are composed of equally
complex regulatory provisions. The major differences between
them is the absence of effective monetary penalties in the Metal
Mine Act. These two Acts provide an ideal framework for analyz-
ing the effectiveness of the monetary penalty. The effectiveness of
the monetary penalty will be discussed first. Then the impact of
the Coal Mine Act with its mandatory civil monetary penalties on
the body of law surrounding the civil penalty area will be analyzed.
Congress, in passing the Coal Mine Act, has approved the
most far-reaching civil penalty provision yet devised-the manda-
tory civil monetary penalty. This provision of the Act mandates
that a civil monetary penalty be assessed for each violation of the
Act or regulations. There is no flexibility. Once the violation, no
matter how trivial, is cited, a penalty is assessed and prosecuted.
This provision, designed to assure compliance with a complicated
regulatory statute, is unique in modem regulatory law. The Coal
Mine Act is also replete with other more specialized penalties,
some of which are not mandatory.
To a great extent, the success or failure of the Coal Mine Act
will determine the future course of Congress in enacting new regu-
latory statutes. If the Coal Mine Act becomes bogged down in legal
challenges, then new devices to compel compliance will be sought.
If the Act is effective, then mandatory civil penalties will become
the preeminent regulatory device of the future.
A. Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act
The Metal Mine Act'30 was passed in 1966 in order to reduce
the high accident rate and improve the health and safety condi-
'2 30 U.S.C. §§ 721 et seq. (1966).
'" 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970).
'1 30 U.S.C. §§ 721 et seq. (1966).
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tions in mining and milling operations carried on in the metal and
nonmetallic mineral industries. The Metal Mine Act established
a federal program of systematic inspection, either by federal au-
thorities alone or in conjunction with state authorities in state plan
states, of all mineral mining operations which affect commerce.
The Act requires the development, promulgation, and enforcement
of health and safety standards. The Secretary of the Interior, or an
authorized representative, is required to inspect mines and to de-
velop and enforce health and safety standards.'3 '
A short summary of the background of this legislation is essen-
tial to an analysis of the effectiveness of the Metal Mine Act.
Working conditions in metal mines have always been hazardous.,"
It was not until 1956 that Congress took note of this problem, and
finally in 1961, after extensive hearings and strong opposition from
the mining industry,'33 Public Law 87-300 was enacted. This law
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a study con-
cerning the causes and prevention of injuries and health hazards,
the existing health and safety conditions and the scope and ade-
quacy of state mine safety laws.'34 On November 13, 1963, the Mine
Safety Study Board transmitted its report and recommendations
to Congress. The Study itself was unique and its findings spoke
poorly of the mining industry:
The study by the Mine Safety Study Board-the only nation-
wide study that has ever been made on the basis of mandatory,
rather than voluntary, reporting of employment and accident
information by metal and nonmetallic mine operators-clearly
demonstrated the widespread existence of correctable hazards
to life and health in mines inspected during the study, a high
casualty rate suffered by working miners from dangerous condi-
tions beyond their own control, and the ineffectiveness of State
and local efforts to reduce mine health and safety hazards."
The Board found that the injury frequency rates were ex-
tremely high - 19.61 injuries per million hours in surface mining
operations and 44.11 injuries per million hours in underground
,' 1966 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News, 2846, et seq.
S . Rep. No. 1296; 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1966).
11 The mining industry opposed the Metal Mine Act, arguing that the law was
not necessary, that the states were regulating the industry and that it was unfair
to single out the mining industry.
I" Act of September 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-300, 75 Stat. 649.
'3 H.R. Rep. No. 606, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
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mining. This contrasted unfavorably with the overall injury rate
for all American industries of only 6.21 injuries per million hours.'36
The Board found that over half of the fatal injuries were caused
by circumstances over which the workmen had no control. They
were victims of inadequate supervision, inadequate safety devices,
defective equipment and generally hazardous environmental con-
ditions. Inspections by the Bureau of Mines revealed an excessive
number of hazards in mines. Hazards varied greatly and included
unguarded machinery, improper handling of explosives, lack of
safety devices on locomotives, and lack of air testing devices.
Moreover, the federal inspectors found, upon reinspection of a
mine, that the hazardous conditions once called to the mine opera-
tor's attention had gone uncorrected. Mine operators had a lax
attitude toward safety hazards. Only about half of the reinspected
mines had corrected the identified hazards.
The Board conducted a thorough analysis of the scope and
adequacy of the state mine safety laws. The conclusion was that
enforcement by the states was unsatisfactory. If there was a state
law, (and in many states there was none) all workers were not
covered, or else there was inadequate funding and personnel. Sala-
ries of state mine inspectors were so low as to cast doubt on the
ability of the state to attract qualified personnel. The Board
summed up its dismal results by stating:
The number and severity of the injuries experienced each year
by persons employed in the extractive industries should be
alarming to an America that prides itself on its ... concern for
the welfare of its citizens. In the face of 10,000 lost-time injuries
and more than 200 deaths in a single year, it would be difficult
to ignore the need for positive action .... [Tihe present
structure of State-law coverage and enforcement is clearly inad-
equate to deal comprehensively with the problem of safety in
the mineral industry.137
To remedy these problems, Congress passed the Metal Mine
Act. The Act covered, "[E]ach mine the products of which regu-
larly enter commerce, or the operations of which affect com-
merce. . .. "I" Although this grant of authority includes all
mines, the Secretary of the Interior may decline to assert jurisdic-
tion over any class or category of mine where the effect on com-
'. Id. at 3.
J Id. at 5.
25 30 U.S.C. § 722(a) (1966).
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merce is insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction.'3" The
Secretary has never declined jurisdiction over any mine. The word
"mine" is defined in the Act as: (1) an area of land from which
minerals other than coal or lignite are extracted in nonliquid form,
(2) private ways and roads appurtenant to such areas, and (3)
land, excavations, underground passageways, workings, struc-
tures, facilities, equipment used in the work of extracting such
minerals.' This definition is broad and includes such diverse mine
types as salt, uranium, copper, gold, sand quarries, and gravel pits,
regardless of size. Jurisdiction has been asserted over mines as
small as one person operations and extended to all fifty states and
the territories. The Metal Mine Act provides for the inspection of
underground mines once each year. For purpose of making any
inspection or investigation, authorized representatives are entitled
". .. to admission to, and shall have the right of entry to, upon,
or through, any mine which is subject to this Act."''
The Secretary of Interior is directed to develop, in detail,
health and safety standards for all mines subject to the Act for the
purpose of protection of life, the promotion of health and safety,
and the prevention of accidents in mines which are subject to the
Metal Mine Act. Meticulous procedures are outlined, establishing
the manner in which these regulations are to be promulgated. The
final product is lengthy and comprehensively affects all mines.'
The Metal Mine Act does not provide any mandatory health
or safety standards. Rather, the Act gives the Secretary of the
Interior a mandate to develop appropriate standards. Congress
intended that the Secretary develop standards for the major health
hazards such as silicosis and other respiratory diseases, not just for
the more traditional safety problems.'
To further promote the twin goals of health and safety, the
Metal Mine Act provides for state plans. These state plans are
provided for in Section 16 of the Act, which in pertinent part
states:
In order to promote sound and effective coordination in Federal
and State activities within the field covered by this Act, the
'"' 30 U.S.C. § 722(b) (1966).
30 U.S.C. § 721 (1966).
' 30 U.S.C. § 724 (1966).
14 See 30 C.F.R. Parts 55, 56, 57 and 58 (1976).
4 H.R. Rep. No. 606, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1965).
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Secretary shall cooperate with the official mine inspection or
safety agencies of the several states."'
State plan agreements were reached in six states. Most states
merely abolished their state agencies, thus leaving the federal gov-
ernment to take over the expense and headaches of regulating the
mines. Of the states with plans, only the major mining states have
vigorously enforced the law. Friction has arisen between the state
and the federal government on the issue of uncoordinated inspec-
tions. Some mine operators, at the urging of state officials, have
refused to permit federal inspectors to enter their mines unless
accompanied by state mine inspectors. Overall, however, peaceful
relations have continued with both state and federal agencies in-
specting the mines.
The Secretary's arsenal for enforcing the Metal Mine Act is
limited. Section 14 provides the only penalties for violation of the
Act and its regulations. Section 14(a) states:
Whenever an operator (1) violates or fails or refuses to comply
with any order of withdrawal and debarment issued under sec-
tion 8 or section 9 of this Act, or (2) interferes with, hinders, or
delays the Secretary, or his duly authorized representative, in
carrying out his duties under this Act, or (3) refuses to admit
an authorized representative of the Secretary to any mine which
is subject to this Act, or (4) refuses to permit the inspection or
investigation of any mine which is subject to this Act, or of an
accident, injury, or occupational disease occurring in or con-
nected with such a mine or (5) being subject to the provisions
of section 13 of this Act, refuses to furnish any information or
report requested by the Secretary, a civil action for preventive
relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order or other order, may be instituted
by the Secretary in the district court of the United States for
the district in which the mine in question is located or in which
the mine operator has its principal office."'
The injunctive provisions provided for in Section 14(a) are
cumbersome and lengthy. The average delay between the act of
refusing entry and the operator's appearance in federal district
court is six months or more. If the operator decides to cooperate
before ordered to do so by the court, no further relief is available.
Even if the court orders compliance, there is no monetary penalty
"1 30 U.S.C. § 735 (1966).
1 30 U.S.C. § 733(a) (1966).
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for the past misbehavior. Contempt citations are rare and occur
only in the most aggravated circumstances.
Since there is no-penalty for violating an order of the Secre-
tary, there is no monetary incentive for a mine operator to allow
inspections or comply with provisions of the Act. For example, if
an operator refuses to allow federal inspection for six months, the
mine can be operated without regard to federal standards during
this time. Compliance with federal standards is costly, and this
"free" time outweighs any cost incurred in litigation. Fortunately,
only a few mine operators exploit this weakness in the statute.
Most operators comply out of a desire to avoid adverse publicity,
a desire to avoid "problems with the government", a genuine con-
cern for their employees' safety, or to avoid union problems. These
constraints affect larger mines to a greater extent than small ones,
and it is the small mine operator that is the subject of most litiga-
tion.
The only monetary penalties provided in the Act are those
outlined in Section 14(b), which states:
Whoever violates or fails or refuses to comply with an order of
withdrawal and debarment issued (1) under subsection (a) of
section 8 or (2) under subsection (b) of section 8 if the failure
to comply with an order of abatement has created a danger that
could cause death or serious physical harm in such mine imme-
diately or before the imminence of such danger can be elimi-
nated, shall upon conviction thereof be punished for each such
offense by a fine of not less than $100, or more than $3,000, or
by imprisonment not to exceed sixty days, or both. In any in-
stance in which such offense is committed by a corporation, the
officer or authorized representative of such corporation who
knowingly permits such offense to be committed shall, upon
conviction, be subject to the same fine or imprisonment, or
both.'
These penalties are criminal and only useful in the very lim-
ited circumstance where a mine operator violates an imminent
danger order of withdrawal, ordering that all or part of the mine
cease operation. So limited is this provision that it has never been
used and not one penalty has ever been collected. Orders and
notices can be violated by operators with impunity and no penalty
will be assessed.
"s 30 U.S.C. § 733 (1966).
[Vol. 79
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How effective has this statute been? Federal inspectors now
inspect underground mines four times a year and surface mines are
inspected once a year if possible. The number of qualified federal
inspectors is limited and this severely restricts the frequency of
inspection. Smaller mines operate without any inspections because
their existence is unknown. There are not enough federal inspec-
tors and equipment to keep track of all mines. The larger opera-
tions are, however, inspected either by federal inspectors or by
state and federal inspectors working together.
These inspections are infrequent and not nearly as thorough
as inspections of coal mines. Many federal inspectors feel that
state inspectors tip off the mine operators of the impending inspec-
tion. During the inspection, federal inspectors issue notices of vio-
lation for conditions which violate the regulations. The mine oper-
ator is given a reasonable time to correct a cited condition and, if
the condition is corrected, the notice of violation is terminated.'47
This termination ends the affair. There is no penalty for having
violated the health and safety regulations initially, even if the
violation was caused by willful conduct on the part of the mine
operator. A mine operator can correct violations as cited and ignore
the safety regulations until another federal inspector appears at
the mine. Safe working conditions at the mine are created only
because of the mine operator's desire to have a safe mine, by socie-
tal pressures, or by union pressure on the operator.
Not only is there no penalty for violating the Act, but if the
mine operator ignores the notice of violation, the federal inspector
must then issue an order of withdrawal. The Act provides in perti-
nent part:
(b) If, upon any such inspection or investigation, an author-
ized representative finds that there has been a failure to comply
with a mandatory standard which is applicable to such mine,
but that such failure to comply has not created a danger that
could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical
harm in such mine immediately or before the imminence of
such danger can be eliminated, he shall find what would be a
reasonable period of time within which such violation should be
totally abated and thereupon issue a notice fixing a reasonable
time for the abatement of the violation. If, upon the expiration
of such period of time as originally fixed or extended, the au-
" 30 U.S.C. § 727 (1966).
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thorized representative finds that such violation has not been
totally abated, and if he also finds that such period of time
should not be further extended, he shall also find the extent of
the area which is affected by such violation. Thereupon, he
shall promptly make an order requiring the operator of such
mine to cause all persons in such area, excepting the following
persons whose presence in such area is necessary to abate the
violation described in the order, to be withdrawn from and to
be debarred from entering such area."'
Once this "order" is issued, only three classes of personnel are
allowed to enter the affected area. These are: (1) persons whose
presence in such area is necessary, in the judgment of the operator,
to abate the violation, (2) any public official whose duties require
him to enter such area and (3) any legal or technical consultant or
representative of the employees, who is a person qualified to make
mine inspections or is accompanied by one, and whose presence in
such mine is necessary in the judgment of the mine operator for
the proper investigation of the conditions cited in the order."'
An order of withdrawal, which is given to a recalcitrant mine
operator for refusing to abate the conditions cited in the notice of
violation within a reasonable time, is intended to withdraw the
hazardous equipment from service, thereby depriving the mine
operator of its use until the cited condition is repaired. The theory
has some appeal, but is flawed. If the mine operator chooses to
ignore the order of withdrawal, as discussed earlier, and operates
the forbidden equipment while making the needed repairs at his
leisure, the Secretary is without a remedy. By the time a federal
injunction is brought, the order is terminated and the condition
repaired. The operator is subject to no penalty and has been re-
warded by having the use of unsafe equipment for many months.,"
The absence of any penalty limits the effectiveness of the order.
The threat of criminal penalties has only been effective in cases
involving serious mine hazards or imminent danger situations.
Serious mine hazards are remedied by imminent danger orders of
withdrawal. This is the strongest sanction available to the Secre-
tary. The Act states:
If, upon any inspection or investigation of a mine which is sub-
30 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1966).
' 30 U.S.C. § 727(b)(1) (1966).
' This is due to the fact that 30 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1966) provides no penalties
except in the case of an operator violating an imminent danger order of withdrawal.
[Vol. 79
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ject to this Act, an authorized representative of the Secretary
finds that conditions or practices in such mine are such that a
danger exists which could reasonably be expected to cause
death or serious physical harm immediately or before the im-
minence of such danger can be eliminated, such representative
shall determine the extent of the area of such mine throughout
which the danger exists, and thereupon issue an order requiring
the operator of such mine to cause all persons, except the follow-
ing persons whose presence in such area is necessary to elimi-
nate the danger described in such order, to be withdrawn from,
and to be debarred from entering such area."'
This order allows a federal mine inspector to shut down an entire
mine until the hazardous condition is corrected. It is the most
severe sanction available to the federal government to insure safe
mines under the Metal Mine Act.'52
If a mine operator chooses to ignore this order of withdrawal,
the Secretary may seek a temporary restraining order under Sec-
tion 14(a) of the Act from the appropriate district court to compel
compliance. For the most part, courts act rapidly in this situation.
There is only an average delay of two weeks between the refusal
to comply and the issuance of the court order."' Once the court
order is issued, the operator must comply or be subject to a con-
tempt citation.
The mine operator is also exposed to criminal penalties for
violating this imminent danger order of withdrawal. The corporate
veil does not protect the representative of the corporation who
authorized the violation of the order of withdrawal. The language
of the criminal penalty statute is tough, but this remedy has never
been implemented. Mine operators have violated imminent danger
orders of withdrawal and have not been fined. The reasons for this
are complex.
The Justice Department, because of its large case load, will
only prosecute criminal actions which are extremely aggravated.'54
"1 30 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1966).
112 See Comment, "Enforcement Powers Under the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969: Does Procedural Due Process Apply in the Coal Fields?",
13 DUQUESNE L. Rzv. 303 (1975).
15 The rapid response is possible because Interior Department attorneys are
allowed to represent the Department in federal court. The Justice Department has
routinely granted this authority on a case-by-case basis.
' Each proposed criminal action must be thoroughly investigated and then
submitted to the Justice Department. So far no actions have been proposed under
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The Metal Mine Act and the Coal Mine Act are of low priority,
and the "Speedy Trials Act"'55 forces the prosecution of the most
serious criminal actions.
The Interior Department is reluctant to push actions that the
Justice Department is unlikely to accept because it wishes to pre-
serve its credibility with the Justice Department when very impor-
tant criminal actions arise. Moreover, the violators of imminent
danger orders of withdrawal are almost exclusively small mine
operators. The Interior Department is reluctant to bring criminal
actions against small local operators because jury convictions are
difficult to obtain in the local courts.
These conditions have resulted in no prosecutions under this
criminal provision. No cases have been deemed aggravated enough
to warrant criminal indictment.'56
How effective has the Metal Mine Act been in compelling
compliance with the mandatory health and safety standards? The
Secretary of the Interior in a letter to the President of the Senate
stated:
We agree that the present legislation for the noncoal sector,
although progressive in its day, must be replaced with legisla-
tion equal in caliber to the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 .... 157
A major problem with the Metal Mine Act is that enforcement
sanctions are cumbersome. No penalties are imposed for past con-
duct. The major factors cited for the ineffectiveness of the Metal
Mine Act are: (1) the inadequate inspection force, (2) the large
number of mines, and (3) the lack of meaningful sanctions. The
lack of civil penalties has been repeatedly blamed as a major weak-
ness in the Act. Proposals for amending the Metal Mine Act stress
the need for mandatory civil penalties and cite approvingly the
success of the Coal Mine Act in achieving compliance with the
mandatory health and safety standards.
the Metal Mine Act. Criminal actions under the Coal Mine Act are carefully scruti-
nized.
I" See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-56 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1976).
11 Recently, there has been an increase in the number of metal mine operators
refusing to comply with closure orders. This increase may result in criminal actions
against them.
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In advocating a bill to strengthen the Metal Mine Act, the
Vice President of the United Steelworkers of America told the
House Committee on Education and Labor:
We are interested in a penalty system not because of its
punitive value but rather because of its preventive value. Cita-
tions and fines can bring about a better "voluntary" compliance
before an inspection is made and a violation discovered. After
the violation is discovered we are, of course, more interested in
abatement of the violation but the threat of fines does create a
situation more conducive to compliance. 58
The Metal Mine Act has not been as effective in achieving safety
in the Nation's metal mines as the Coal Mine Act has been for the
Nation's coal mines. The primary reason for this ineffectiveness is
the lack of monetary civil penalties.
B. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 is strik-
ingly similar to the Metal Mine Act. The difference lies in the Coal
Mine Act's enforcement provisions which are in the forefront of the
law of monetary penalties. The Coal Mine Act is in almost every
respect more vigorously enforced than the Metal Mine Act. It is
more effective in its impact on industry. It has led to the collection
of more civil penalty monies than any other remedial legislation.
The mandatory civil penalty provisions are unique to the law and
have created turmoil among coal industry lawyers. This turmoil
has extended to the Supreme Court.
In enacting the Coal Mine Act, Congress declared:
(a) the first priority and concern of all in the coal mining indus-
try must be the health and safety of its most precious re-
source-the miner. 59
The hazardous nature of coal mining was recognized by Congress
as long ago as 1865 when a bill to create a Federal Mining Bureau
was introduced in Congress. Little was done, however, until 1910
when Congress established a Bureau of Mines as the result of a
series of coal mine disasters. This Act was essentially hortatory
'" Testimony of John S. Johns, Vice President, United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica before House Committee on Education and Labor, Subcommittee on Man-
power, Compensation and Health and Safety, November 13, 1975. This testimony
is unpublished.
"19 30 U.S.C. § 801(a) (1970).
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and amounted merely to federal recognition of the serious hazards
involved in mining. In 1939, Congress passed the Federal Coal
Mine Safety Act. This granted federal inspectors the right to make
inspections of mines but had no provision for establishing safety
standards. From 1946 to 1947 the Federal Government operated a
substantial portion of the Nation's coal mines. During this time, a
Federal Mine Safety Code was voluntarily enforced.
In 1947, Congress requested coal operators and state agencies
to report the extent of compliance with Bureau of Mines' recom-
mendations. There was only one-third compliance with Bureau
recommendations among the seventeen states reporting. The
death of 119 miners in a mine disaster in 1951 led to enactment of
the 1952 Federal Coal Mine Safety Act. This Act applied only to
coal mines with greater than fifteen employees, relied on state
accident prevention programs, and contained exemptions to safety
provisions and complex procedural provisions delaying the en-
forcement of orders of withdrawal. This law was amended in 1966
to include coal mines with fewer than fifteen employees and cre-
ated a reinspection order of withdrawal for repeat violators of the
safety provisions. Even after these amendments, large numbers of
safety and health violations were outside the scope of the federal
statute. This nonfederal area of coal mine safety was passed over
by Congress to be regulated by the states and by the Bureau of
,Mines Advisory Coal Mine Safety Code.
Notwithstanding many desirable features in the Advisory Code,
the abysmally poor record of abatement of violations observed
during inspections negated its value as a meaningful safety tool.
During the period 1960 through 1968, 91,940 violations of Fed-
eral and State law were observed during inspection; 78,337 were
abated immediately and the remainder were abated after the
issuance of a notice of violation. On the other hand, during the
same period, there were over 1.3 million violations of the Code
observed by Federal inspectors; only 231,000 were abated.'0
Attempts were made to remedy the weakness of the Coal Mine
Act, but all languished in Congress. Then, on November 20, 1968,
Consolidation Coal Company's Number Nine Mine near Farming-
ton, West Virginia, exploded, killing seventy-eight miners. This
disaster provided the final push for the present Coal Mine Act:
"I House Committee on Education and Labor, Legislative History, Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, S. Rep. No. 91-411, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969),
[hereinafter cited as Legislative History].
[Vol. 79
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Once again, the adage is being proved that "dead miners have
always been the most powerful influence in securing passage of
mining legislation.""'
The purpose of the present Act is (1) to establish interim
mandatory health and safety standards with directions to develop
and promulgate improved mandatory health and safety standards,
(2) to require each operator of a coal mine and every miner in such
mine to comply with these standards, (3) to cooperate with and
provide assistance to the states, and (4) to improve and expand
research and development training programs aimed at preventing
coal mine accidents.' The Coal Mine Act sets out detailed man-
datory health and safety standards which have been expanded by
regulation. These standards and regulations affect every conceiva-
ble phase of mining.' 3 It has been estimated that there are many
thousands of possible violations between the entry of the mine and
the face area, and it has been stated that it is impossible to operate
a mine without violating the law.
To enforce these safety regulations, the Coal Mine Act gives
a federal mine inspector the right to enter a mine.' All under-
ground coal mines in the nation are inspected at least four times a
year, and sometimes more often. All known coal mines are in-
spected. During an inspection, a federal inspector issues notices of
violation for each violation of the Act or its regulations. The
inspector may also close all or part of a mine in four different major
circumstances. First, he may issue an imminent danger order of
withdrawal if he finds that an imminent danger exists. Second, he
may issue a "B" order of withdrawal in accordance with 30 U.S.C.
814(b) (1970), for failure of the operator to abate the conditions
cited in a notice of violation in a reasonable time. This "B" order
prohibits the working of a mine area or piece of equipment until
the condition cited in the original notice of violation is corrected.
Third, the inspector may issue a "C" order in accordance with 30
U.S.C. 814(c) (1970). This order is issued when an inspector finds
a violation of the health and safety standards which does not create
an imminent danger, but which does significantly and substan-
tially contribute to a mine safety or health hazard and such viola-
tion is caused by an unwarrantable failure of the operator. The
"I Id. at 7.
112 30 U.S.C. § 801(g) (1970).
" See 30 C.F.R. Parts 70, 71, 74, 75 and 77 (1975).
30 U.S.C. § 813(a)-(b) (1970).
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final order of withdrawal is an order issued to insure the safety of
any person in a coal mine after an accident has occurred. This is a
"control" order issued under 30 U.S.C. 813(f) (1970), which allows
the inspector to conduct an investigation in a mine and to prohibit
all unneeded personnel from the affected area until the investiga-
tion is complete.
These four orders of withdrawal along with the notice of viola-
tion are the major tools available to an inspector charged with
enforcing safety in mines. There are other types of orders which
can be issued but these are almost never used.' Compliance with
these orders of withdrawal is compelled by both civil penalties and
injunctive relief. The injunctive relief is as cumbersome and time-
consuming as it is in the enforcement of the Metal Mine Act. But
the similarity ends here.
The civil penalty provisions of the Coal Mine Act are second
to none. All violations of the Act are fined. The Act states in
pertinent part that:
The operator of a coal mine in which a violation occurs of a
mandatory health or safety standard or who violates any other
provisions of this Act, except the provisions of title 4, shall be
assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary under paragraph (3)
of this subsection which penalty shall not be more than $10,000
for each such violation. Each occurrence of a violation of a
mandatory health or safety standard may constitute a separate
offense .... "I
Not only are violations of the health and safety standards
assessed penalties but violations of any other provision are fined.
This provision eliminates many of the loopholes that are found in
the Metal Mine Act. First, all violations are fined. An operator
issued an order of withdrawal who ignores the order will be fined
even though the delay in the injunctive relief is months. Moreover,
"1 30 U.S.C. § 813(e) (1970) allows the federal inspector to issue an order of
withdrawal to facilitate rescue operations. 30 U.S.C. § 814(i) (1970) provides for the
issuance of a closure order if a mine operator is unable to comply with the applica-
ble limit on the concentration of respirable dust in the mine atmosphere. 30 U.S.C.
§ 814(h) (1970) allows the federal mine inspector to issue a closure order when (A)
existing conditions are not imminently dangerous, (B) existing conditions cannot
be effectively abated through existing technology, and (C) reasonable assurances
cannot be provided that continuance of mining operations will not result in an
imminent danger.
"1 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(1) (1970).
[Vol. 79
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the amount of the penalty will increase if the operator acts in bad
faith. The manner of assessing penalties will be discussed later in
this section.
Furthermore, the provision of penalties for violation of "any
other provision of the Act" will become operative. It is a violation
of the Coal Mine Act to ignore an order of withdrawal. A "letter"
violation will be issued citing the operator for his violation of the
order of withdrawal. Here again the fine is substantial. The recalci-
trant operator is fined heavily each time he violates the Act. The
mine operator's refusals to allow inspections are fined by "letter"
violation. Each act which stymies effective enforcement of the
Metal Mine Act is penalized under the Coal Mine Act.
The penalty provisions of the Coal Mine Act do not end there.
Willful violators are punished by both criminal fines and jail
terms. The Act provides that:
(b) Any operator who willfully violates a mandatory health or
safety standard, or knowingly violates or fails or refuses to com-
ply with any order issued under section 814 of this subchapter,
or any order incorporated in a final decision issued under this
title, except an order incorporated in a decision under subsec-
tion (a) of this section or section 820(b)(2) of this title, shall,
upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than
$25,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by
both, except that if the conviction is for a violation committed
after the first conviction of such operator under this chapter
punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000, or by
imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both.'67
Unlike the record under the Metal Mine Act, there have been
criminal convictions under the Coal Mine Act. Of course, criminal
convictions are rare and make up only a very small part of the fines
assessed. Still, the general vigor of the Coal Mine Act in assessing
mandatory civil penalties has carried over to criminal prosecu-
tions. '6
Another type of penalty singles out the corporate mine opera-
tor. Whenever a corporate operator violates a mandatory health or
"v 30 U.S.C. § 819(b) (1970).
"' The final outcome of the criminal action against Finley Coal Company,
reported in United States v. Finley Coal Company, 493 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1974),
resulted in a note contendre plea on four counts; twenty-four counts were dismissed.
Mr. Finley paid a $12,500 fine.
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safety standard or knowingly violates or refuses to comply with any
order issued under the Act, the director, officer, or agent of such
corporation who knowingly authorized such violation shall be sub-
ject to civil penalties. These "civil" violations are administratively
assessed. The corporate officer authorizing the violation of the Act
receives a notice of violation and a proposed assessment. A hearing
before an administrative law judge is conducted and an order fin-
ing the corporate officer a substantial sum is entered. Once the
order becomes final, the corporate officer or agent must pay, or the
case will be referred to the appropriate district court for collection.
The initiation of the individual corporate penalty has sur-
prised many officers of corporate mines and has been used to com-
plement the injunctive process.' Challenges have been made, as-
serting that the individual civil penalty is in reality a criminal
penalty. There has, however, been no definitive ruling to date.
Surprisingly, many of the corporate officers have paid the assessed
penalty without engaging in litigation, possibly to avoid the stigma
of being singled out as a violator of the Act. These penalties are
considered highly effective by the Mining Enforcement Safety
Administration, since now mine operators who refuse to permit
federal mine inspectors to enter their mine or who ignore closure
orders may become engaged in litigation before both federal dis-
trict court and before an administrative forum.
Another penalty providing a criminal sanction is assessed
against persons who make false statements, representations or cer-
tifications in any application, record, report, plan, or document
required to be filed and maintained by the Act. A violation of this
provision carries with it a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment
for up to six months. This provision is increasingly important be-
cause of the large amount of record keeping required to insure that
the mine operator has systematically complied with the Act. No
convictions have occurred under this provision, although investiga-
tions are taking place. This section is difficult to enforce because
the investigation is tedious and because the Justice Department is
reluctant to press charges. Record keeping violations are not glam-
orous.
"1 30 U.S.C. § 819(c) (1970) provides that whenever a corporate operator vio-
lates a mandatory health or safety standard or knowingly violates or fails or refuses
to comply with any order issued under this Act, the corporate director, officer, or
agent who knowingly authorized such violation is subject to civil penalties, fines,
and imprisonment the same as a person in violation of 30 U.S.C. § 819(a) and (b).
[Vol. 79
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A criminal penalty is provided for anyone who knowingly dis-
tributes, sells, offers for sale, introduces, or delivers in commerce
any equipment- for use in a coal mine which is represented as
complying with the provisions of the Act and does not so comply.
The person may be fined up to $10,000 and be imprisoned for up
to six months.'70 No violations of this section have been prosecuted
and no violations of this provision are known since there is no
market for unapproved mining equipment. An operator using such
equipment would be subject to civil penalties and injunctive ac-
tion. 7 '
The final penalty provision provides that:
(2) Any miner who willfully violates the mandatory safety
standards relating to smoking or the carrying of smoking mate-
rials, matches, or lighters shall be subject to a civil penalty
assessed by the Secretary under paragraph (3) of this subsec-
tion, which penalty shall not be more than $250 for each occurr-
ence of such violation.
72
Although these penalties were not collected during the early en-
forcement of the Act, many penalties are now assessed under this
provision. The basic idea behind this comprehensive program of
monetary penalties was to remove the incentive to violate the Coal
Mine Act. Congress sought to make safety pay in the short run.
To be effective, monetary penalties must be quickly and effi-
ciently enforced. Delay in collection removes the sting of the pen-
alty. Generally, administrative agencies have not yet developed an
efficient means for handling civil penalty cases because the legal
process necessary for collecting these penalties is cumbersome.
Still, civil penalties are effective in circumventing the problems
inherent in the assessment of criminal penalties.'
73
Furthermore, mathematical precision in assessing penalties
has proven to be difficult to achieve. Not only must the amount
of the penalty be similar for similar offenders, the amount assessed
must be greater than the amount saved by skimping on safety.
Some comparison between the subjective opinions of the mine op-
erator as to the relationship between the amount assessed and the
amount saved by avoiding the health and safety and the objective
110 30 U.S.C. § 819(c) (1970).
,' 30 U.S.C. § 819(e) (1970).
27 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(2) (1970).
,7 Goldschmid Report at 899.
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fact must be calculated. Finally, the use of backup sanctions as
aids to civil penalties must be well planned and coordinated. The
criminal sanction should be a real threat to operators who system-
atically avoid the requirements of the Act.
For each of these factors, the Coal Mine Act is designed to be
effective, whereas the Metal Mine Act is ineffective. The approach
of the Coal Mine Act is an attempt to compel compliance. An
analysis of the assessment and collection procedures will set the
framework for understanding the impact of the Coal Mine Act on
the law of monetary penalties. The assessment and collection pro-
cedure of the Coal Mine Act is the largest and most comprehensive
of any congressional regulatory program. The impact of these pro-
cedures on the law of monetary penalties is just beginning to be
felt.
All civil penalties are assessed by the Office of Assessments of
the Interior Department. The assessment process begins when
packets of notices of violation and orders of withdrawal are sent
from the various field offices of the Mining Enforcement and
Safety Administration (MESA) to the Assessment Office. Along
with these packets, information is given to enable the assessment
officer to determine the amount of penalty for each violation.'
Basic information regarding each mine is, of course, on file at the
appropriate Assessment Office. In determining the amount of the
civil penalty, the assessment officer must consider six criteria. The
Act states in pertinent part:
* . . In determining the amount of the penalty, the Secretary
shall consider the operator's history of previous violations, the
appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the
operator charged, whether the operator was negligent, the effect
on the operator's ability to continue in business, the gravity of
the violation, and the demonstrated good faith of the operator
charged in attempting to achieve rapid compliance after notifi-
cation of a violation.
75
The assessment officer must consider these six criteria for each
individual violation.
Violations are grouped in packets of approximately seven for
each mine. Once the violations are assessed, a "Proposed Order of
Assessment" (POA) is sent by certified mail to the mine operator.
,74 30 C.F.R. Part 100 (1975).
I's 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(1) (1970).
[Vol. 79
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This is the initial fine. Along with the POA is a stamped, self-
addressed card. The operator can fill out this card and request a
conference with the assessment officer regarding the amount as-
sessed or request an administrative hearing.
Normally, the mine operator requests an assessment confer-
ence. During this conference, the mine operator can present any
information helpful to his cause to the assessment officer in an
attempt to reduce the penalty. Most penalties are settled during
these conferences by both parties entering into a settlement agree-
ment payable within ten days. If no agreement is reached, the
assessment officer issues a Revised Proposed Order of Assessment
(RPOA) and allows the mine operator thirty days in which to pay.
If the RPOA is not paid, then the file is referred to the Solicitor's
Office of the Department of Interior for an administrative hearing.
The administrative hearing is required by Section 109(a)(3) of the
Act which states:
A civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secretary only after the
person charged with a violation under this Chapter has been
given an opportunity for a public hearing and the Secretary has
determined, by decision incorporating his findings of fact
therein, that a violation did occur, and the amount of the pen-
alty which is warranted, and incorporating, when appropriate,
an order therein requiring that the penalty be paid. . . . Any
hearing under this section shall be of record and shall be subject
to section 554 of Title 5 [of the United States Code].'78
These hearings can be long and drawn-out, since they often
involve expert witnesses on both sides. Because these hearings are
time-consuming, and because of the large number of cases, the
Solicitor's Office has power to settle cases. If the case is not settled,
however, a hearing is held for each case without exception.'77 The
majority of cases are settled.
After the hearing, the administrative law judge renders an
initial decision which will become final in thirty days unless ap-
pealed. An appeal may be made to the Interior Board of Mine
Operations Appeals which exercises the full authority of the Secre-
tary. If a penalty is imposed the mine operator must pay the pen-
alty or it is referred to the Justice Department for collection. The
Act provides that the Secretary may file a petition for enforcement
30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(3) (1970).
"n 30 C.F.R. § 100.7 (1975).
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against any person against whom a civil penalty is assessed who
fails to pay the penalty within the prescribed time. The petition
may only claim the amount assessed by the Secretary, there being
no additional penalty for not paying. This provision has caused
many of the mine operators to delay payment of the penalty until
an action is filed in district court.
The court in which the petition for enforcement is filed has
jurisdiction to enter a judgment enforcing, modifying, or setting
aside the order in whole or in part. The court is instructed to
"consider and determine de novo all relevant issues, except issues
of fact which were or could have been litigated. . . under section
816 of the Act, and upon the request of the respondent, such issues
of fact which are in dispute shall be submitted to a jury."'' Based
on the jury's findings, the court shall determine the amount of
penalty to be imposed. This provision for de novo review has
proved to be a major stumbling block to the enforcement of the
Act. United States Attorneys' Offices are flooded with these collec-
tion cases. This has created a bottleneck in the enforcement pipe-
line. The reasons are complex but revolve around the rights
granted to the mine operator during the assessment process.
On March 9, 1973, the issues involving the assessment collec-
tion procedure came to a head in the landmark decision of Judge
Robinson in National Independent Coal Operators Association v.
Morton. '" This action, brought by the National Independent Coal
Operators Association (NICOA), an association of coal operators,
challenged the procedures adopted by the Bureau of Mines in as-
sessing civil penalties for violations of the health and safety stan-
dards under the Act. This challenge involved at the time more
than 96,000 POA's comprising over 227,000 notices of violations.
The amount assessed was approximately $25,500,000, with 100,000
new notices of violation being issued yearly.
The crux of the challenge was that the procedures adopted by
the Secretary allowed the POA to ripen into a final order of the
Secretary without any formal hearing in the event that the mine
operator defaulted. The assessment procedures at that time al-
lowed a final order, assessing a civil penalty against a mine opera-
tor, to be entered against a defaulting mine operator without any
hearing by an administrative law judge. The default order was
179 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(4) (1970).
,"1 357 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1973).
[Vol. 79
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entered by the Assessment Office and not by an administrative law
judge. The mine operator was, however, given an opportunity for
a hearing. This procedure was challenged, and the district court
held that even though it was undisputed that the operator charged
with a violation is given an opportunity for a hearing, the Secretary
must, under section 109(a)(3), make findings of fact as to the'oc-
currence of a violation and the amount of the penalty in each case,
whether the operator has exercised his opportunity for hearing or
not. The court further found that this statutory provision was nec-
essary to ensure a considered determination by the Secretary in
every case both as to the fact of violation and the amount of the
penalty.'80 Recognizing the tremendous burden this decision
placed on the Secretary, the court merely concluded that it was not
its duty to rewrite the statute for the administrators. The Secre-
tary was required to make detailed findings of fact even where the
mine operator made no effort to request a formal hearing after
being notified of the hearing provisions of the Act.
This decision threw havoc into the entire assessment proce-
dure and cast doubt on all cases referred to the United States
Attorney's Office for collection. The entire assessment proceeding
was changed to include a formal hearing procedure for each case.''
The court of appeals on February 11, 1974, reversed Judge Robin-
son and held that no formal decision was required unless the mine
operator takes advantage of that opportunity by requesting one.
Once given notice of his right to a hearing, the operator's failure
to request a hearing suggests that he does not dispute the fact of
violation nor disagree with the appropriateness of the specific
penalty proposed. The rationale for the decision of the court of
appeals is that Congress does not intend for administrative agen-
cies to perform a meaningless task.'82
This decision was placed in doubt one month later when the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declared the assessment
procedures unconstitutional. The court, in Morton v. Delta Min-
ing, Inc.,'8 held that the final orders of the Secretary assessing civil
penalties under the Coal Mine Act were invalid because they were
entered without making and publishing factual findings, even
though the mine operator had not requested a hearing. The court
I ld. at 512.
,' 30 C.F.R. § 1007(c) (1975) now requires a hearing in each case.
' 494 F.2d 987, 991, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
' 495 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1974).
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found that the language of the Act manifested congressional intent
that every final assessment order of the Secretary be accompanied
by findings of fact. Congress, the court urged, required explicit and
public findings of fact, as necessary to insure that the administra-
tive process did not degenerate into arbitrariness. The court con-
cluded that though flexibility and the capacityto make rapid de-
terminations are vital weapons in every administrator's arsenal,
proper standards are implicit in every case of administrative dis-
cretion. The appellate court further found that even though the
final orders of the Secretary were subject to de novo review by a
district court before collection, the assessment procedure would
not be saved since such review is rendered practically impossible,
or at least vastly more difficult, where the agency's decision is not
accompanied by express findings.' 4
Because of the split between the two circuit courts and the
importance of the Coal Mine Act, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Oral argument was held during the Fall 1975 term. The
Supreme Court on January 26, 1976, rendered two unanimous de-
cisions upholding the assessment procedure of the Coal Mine Act.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in National Inde-
pendent Coal Operators Association v. Kleppe, a5 held that the
language of the statute, especially in light of its legislative history,
requires that the Secretary of the Interior make formal findings of
fact only when the mine operator requests a hearing.
The requirement for a formal hearing under § 109 (a)(3) is
keyed to a request, and the requirement for formal findings is
keyed to the same request.' 8
The Court noted the necessity for default procedures.
Effective enforcement of the Act would be weakened if the Sec-
retary were required to make findings of fact for every penalty
assessment including those cases in which the mine operator
did not request a hearing and thereby indicated no disagree-
ment with the Secretary's proposed determination."7
The Court in Thomas S. Kleppe v. Delta Mining, Inc.,'" reversed
"1 Id. at 42.
M 423 U.S. 388 (1976).
in Id. at 392.
" Id. at 393.
423 U.S. 403 (1976).
[Vol. 79
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the Third Circuit decision and remanded the case for determina-
tion in accordance with the NICOA case.
Each of these decisions has removed a tremendous roadblock
to the enforcement of the Coal Mine Act. No longer are all assess-
ments suspect. New legal challenges, however, will certainly arise.
For example, the scope of de novo review will have to be estab-
lished. But there can be no doubt that the decisions of the Su-
preme Court were a boost for enforcement of the Coal Mine Act.
Notwithstanding the positive impact of the ruling of the Su-
preme Court, the adverse impact of the lower courts' rulings have
been substantial. The collection procedures have been held up for
four years because of a narrow and strict construction of the Act
by the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals. These courts treated the civil penalty
provision as criminal in nature and, therefore, the statute was
construed narrowly. The implicit assumption in the cases over-
turning the assessment procedure was that since the government
is bringing the action, the statute must be construed narrowly as
a criminal action, even though an "opportunity for a public hear-
ing" is provided as required by the statute and the mine operator
has defaulted by failing to request a hearing. The civil nature of
the proceeding went unnoticed during the analysis of the District
Court of the District of Columbia and that of the Third Circuit.
The objections of the mine operators were so technical that during
oral argument before the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall queried
counsel for NICOA as to whether or not this case was just a
"lawyers' quarrel."
The criminal penalties under the Coal Mine Act have fared
worse. A criminal action brought under Section 109(b) of the Act
against a mine operator for the willful violation of the mandatory
health and safety standards which resulted in the death of thirty-
eight miners was dismissed in part by the courts because the ap-
plicable health and safety standards were improperly promul-
gated. In United States v. Finley Coal Company,"9 the Sixth Cir-
cuit upheld the dismissal of one count of the indictment on the
grounds that the regulations alleged to have been violated were
not adopted in accordance with Section 101(c) of the Act. 9 ' This
decision though limited to the specific regulations involved, af-
"' 493 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1974).
190 Id.
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fected all "improved" regulations promulgated to make coal mines
safer. The court recognized that great weight must be given to the
agency's interpretation of the statute it is charged with administer-
ing, but concluded that the procedures for promulgating regula-
tions by Congress must be strictly observed.
Accordingly, we concluded that an administrative officer's in-
terpretation of an Act of Congress to permit him to exercise
broad power to flesh-out a statute by revising interim statutory
standards should be tested with less indulgence. This is particu-
larly true when the interpretation permits promulgation of reg-
ulations and their willful violation can result in criminal prose-
cution. In this instance, we hold that the procedures established
by Congress must be strictly observed."'
Strict construction of criminal statutes is to be expected. It is
instructive, however, to compare the construction given to the Coal
Mine Act by the lower courts in the civil action as opposed to the
criminal action. In both actions the statute was narrowly construed
even though other interpretations were possible. The reason for
this anomaly must be in the attitude that civil penalties are ac-
tually criminal in nature. These challenges to the monetary pen-
alty system have forced revision upon revision in the assessment
procedure and have severely limited the effectiveness of the civil
and criminal penalties. Although the Supreme Court finally up-
held the assessment procedures in the civil action, substantial
damage had been done to the effectiveness of the civil penalty.
Besides invalidating two specific federal regulations and cast-
ing doubt on all "improved" health and safety standards, the
Finley case has resulted in a scandal casting doubt on the Govern-
ment's ability to prosecute criminal charges for health and safety
violations in coal mines. The scandal arose when the Government's
prosecutor in the Finley case resigned from the United States At-
torney's Office and joined the law firm that had represented Finley
Coal Company during the criminal action. The prosecutor changed
jobs after arguing for dismissal of twenty-four counts of the indict-
ment in return for a nolo contendere plea on four counts. This
change in jobs gained wide publicity in Kentucky.
In an apparent attempt to justify his actions, the former prose-
cutor told the influential Mountain Eagle newspaper that if he had
been in charge of the Government's case from the beginning, there
"I Id. at 290-91.
[Vol. 79
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probably would never have been indictments filed against the com-
pany at all, and that the charges against Finley Coal Company
were "miniscule misdemeanor charges.' 92
In assessing each of the approximately 100,000 yearly viola-
tions of the Coal Mine Act, the Government must apply not only
the six criteria discussed earlier but also must provide uniformity
in its treatment of each mine. This process has caused the assess-
ment bureaucracy to become bogged down with paper work.
Four problem areas have been identified by internal auditors
and the General Accounting Office (GAO).' These four areas have
continually hampered efficient enforcement of the Act. First, the
penalty assessments, settlements, and collections are exceedingly
slow. Delays have been as long as five years. Second, the penalties
paid are significantly lower than the amounts originally assessed.
This lowering of penalty amounts obviously detracts from the
value of the penalty as a deterrent. Third, the factors used in
determining the amount of penalty initially assessed and collected
are inconsistently applied. The amounts assessed for the same
violation at the same mine vary, depending upon the assessment
officer assigned to the case. Finally, controls are not adequate to
insure that all violations are assessed, or that those which are
assessed are actually settled or collected. Some controls are so lax
that many files "slipped through the cracks."
To improve the assessment, settlement, and collection proce-
dures, MESA has revised its procedures five times with a sixth
revision in the works. These revisions have been comprehensive
and have resulted in the complete elimination of any of the four
problem areas. These four areas interact, and along with the legal
challenges, have resulted in low penalties. It is important to ana-
lyze each of the four areas in detail to show how the interrela-
tionship among them lessens the deterrent effect of the civil pen-
alty.
There is no dispute that penalty assessments and collections
have been extremely slow. On average, before 1975, it took MESA
149 days to assess 327 violations with an additional 117 days for
MESA to collect fines for 74 of the violations. The other 153 viola-
... UNITED MINE WORKERS JOURNAL, 87th Year, No. 4., (1976) at 5.
"I GAO, Report to the Congress, Improvements Still Needed in Coal Mine
Dust-Sampling Program and Penalty Assessments and Collections (December 31,
1975) at 40-46 [hereinafter referred to as "GAO Report"].
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tions were uncollected at the time of the conclusion of the study.
Depending on whether the operator chose to pay or not, many of
these violations are still subject to litigation. Since there is no
additional penalty assessed against the operator if the case must
be referred to the Department of Justice for collection, the mine
operator may simply wait. Some have been waiting for as long as
five years. MESA officials stated to the GAO that the fines were
not promptly collected because the penalty amounts were higher
than the operators were willing to pay, the penalties were contested
in courts, and that MESA did not have sufficient personnel to
handle the work load.
The GAO analyzed eighty-three cases settled by the Solictor's
Office of the Department of the Interior and found that the average
assessed penalty of $200 was reduced to $70 for settlement. This is
a reduction of 65 percent. The GAO further found that in the cases
in which an administrative hearing was requested before the Office
of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), the administrative law judges
further reduced the penalty assessments. Even after the adminis-
trative hearing, the mine operator is entitled to de novo review in
federal district court and an opportunity to settle with the United
States Attorney's Office.
In revising the assessment procedures, MESA has reduced the
amount of the penalty assessed in order to conform to the amounts
usually assessed by the administrative law judge. Basically,
MESA has attempted to establish the penalties at a level which
will encourage mine operators to comply with the Act rather than
violate the standards. The new procedures have resulted in lower
fines and increased settlements. Recalcitrant operators are enjoy-
ing long delays, however, along with the reduced penalties. The
GAO agreed that MESA's revised assessment and collection proce-
dures will aid in obtaining timely collections, but questioned the
effectiveness of a reduced penalty as a deterrent to compliance
with the health and safety standards.
The second problem hampering enforcement is the inconsist-
ent application of the six criteria for assessing penalties. Each
violation must be assessed in accordance with the six criteria
which are: (1) history of previous violations, (2) appropriateness of
the penalty to the size of the business, (3) negligence, (4) effect on
the operator's ability to stay in business, (5) gravity of the viola-
tion, and (6) good faith in compliance. The GAO found in its
sample of fifty-five mines that MESA inconsistently applied the
factors. Often similar violations were assessed differing amounts.
[Vol. 79
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The inconsistencies were greatest in determining gravity and negli-
gence. MESA assessors in determining gravity categorized a viola-
tion as nonserious or serious in accordance with the extent of in-
jury.
Negligence is broken down into three categories: (1) not negli-
gent, where the operator could not reasonably know of the viola-
tion; (2) ordinary negligence, where the operator failed to exercise
reasonable care to prevent or correct a violation; and (3) gross
negligence, where an operator caused the condition by exercising
reckless disregard of the mandatory health or safety standards or
by deliberately and wantonly failing to correct an unsafe condi-
tion. These standards are unclear and assessment officers cannot
consistently interpret the nature of similar violations. The problem
lies in the gap between the inspector citing the violation and the
assessment officer's calculation of the penalty. The assessment
officer's judgment as to each of the criteria is based on personal
experience and the short handwritten information provided by the
inspector for the assessment officer. The GAO recommended more
detailed standards in order to insure consistency in the assess-
ments. While consistency is necessary to insure fairness in the
assessment process, the approach of the GAO is too rigid and com-
plicated because the Coal Mine Act does not demand absolute
consistency in amounts assessed. After all, each violation is subject
to de novo review in district court. This means that regardless of
the manner in which the penalty is determined, an operator may
fully litigate the issue before a jury. Absent court rulings, there is
no need to achieve mathematical certainty in the amounts as-
sessed.
A more compelling defect in the assessment process is the
adequacy of management control over violations. The problem has
been that MESA has no information system to assure that viola-
tions once assessed are collected. Violations have been assessed
twice, some not assessed at all, and invalid violations have been
assessed.
In order to remedy this condition, the Assessment Office de-
veloped a computerized system to track each violation through the
assessment, settlement, hearing and collection procedure. This
system has been successful in keeping track of the violations and
should insure that penalties are assessed and collected for all viola-
tions.
The GAO, in concluding its report, recommended that the
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Secretary of the Interior instruct MESA to more clearly define the
assessment factors in order to insure that uniform assessments and
timely collections will result. Moreover, the report recommended
that the Secretary instruct MESA to evaluate the penalty assess-
ment program to ascertain whether the penalty amounts assessed
are high enough to deter further mine violations.'94
The GAO report is harsh in its evaluation of the civil penalty
assessment process. The report does not, however, advocate the
abolition of mandatory civil penalties, but instead urges efficient
enforcement. The GAO report does not attempt to calculate what
a deterrent penalty would be. Theoretically, a deterrent penalty
must be higher than the "savings" a mine operator incurs in violat-
ing the health and safety standards.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to calculate the cost of safety
for every possible violation. Costs vary from mine to mine and from
day to day. The GAO assumes sub silentio that higher penalties
are needed because the penalties currently assessed are less than
the cost of safety. No proof exists for this assumption. Higher
penalties will result in more deterrence, but only if the penalty is
collectible. The trade-off is between low collectible penalties ver-
sus high uncollectible penalties.
Ignored too in the GAO report are other factors strengthening
the deterrent effect of monetary penalties. Penalties assessed
against mine operators have a nuisance value. Mine operators
must incur substantial legal fees to defend civil penalty suits.
These suits engender adverse publicity which mine operators seek
to avoid. Some operators are stigmatized as being repeat violators.
Industry pressure is brought against the repeat offenders out of fear
of stronger congressional action. The coal industry does not want
additional federal regulation. Increased accidents and fatalities
coupled with concerted efforts to stymie civil penalties would inev-
itably lead to stronger congressional action. Large coal companies
clearly attempt to reduce the number of health and safety viola-
tions in order to improve their "record". Fear of stronger regulation
is a potent incentive.
" Id. at 46.
[Vol. 79
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V. PENALTIES COLLECTED UNDER THE FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH
AND SAFETY ACT OF 1969
A. Effectiveness of Mandatory Civil Penalties as a Deterrent
Acknowledging the negative effect of the legal challenges upon
the effectiveness of the civil penalty provisions and the administra-
tive problems incurred in the assessment procedure, have the civil
penalty provisions resulted in deterrence of health and safety
violations? The intent of Congress in requiring that each violation
of the Coal Mine Act be assessed a civil penalty was clearly an
effort to deter future violations by making present violations
costly. In order to achieve this goal of deterrence, MESA has estab-
lished three criteria: the civil penalties assessed must be (1)
timely, (2) realistic, and (3) consistent.'95
First, if the assessment of the violation is not timely, the mine
operator will not be able to relate the penalty to the specific viola-
tion of the Act, and therefore, the effect of the penalty is nullified.
To be effective, the mine operator must be aware of both the viola-
tion of the Act and the penalty assessed. Second, the penalty must
be reasonable or the mine operator will appeal through the admin-
istrative law forum, thus putting off payment for a long period of
time and again losing sight of the violation-penalty relationship.
Finally, to insure deterrence, a consistent method of determining
the amount of the penalty must be utilized. If the penalties are not
consistently determined, the mining industry will lose confidence
in the assessment program and thereby cause more litigation with
inevitable delay. 96
To fulfill these three basic aims of the assessment program,
new regulations for the assessment of civil penalties were put into
effect on August 1, 1974.111 These regulations have had the net
effect of reducing the amount assessed for each violation. A system
has been established whereby each of the six criteria is assigned
"points". The points are then added up and the amount of the
penalty is determined by reference to a table. This system has the
net effect of reducing penalties because the points are added,
" United States Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Secretary
of the Interior Under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (1974) at 15.
This is the latest available report and was made available to the public in January
1976 [hereinafter referred to as 1974 Annual Report].
I' d.
'7 30 C.F.R. § 100.6 (1975).
61
O'Riordan: The Future of Civil Monetary Penalties: Two Federal Safety Statut
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1977
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
whereas under the old system the points were multiplied.
Toward the end of 1973, the Secretary of the Interior directed
that the large backlog of unassessed violations held in the Office
of Assessments be eliminated. As of January 1, 1974, there were
approximately 62,436 unassessed violations. The goal was to re-
duce the inventory to 3,500 violations by July 1, 1974. To further
aggravate the problem, approximately 43,941 new violations were
expected by the Assessment Office during this period. The Assess-
ment Office met this goal and brought its inventory up to date.
During the January 1 to December 31, 1974 period, 135,483 viola-
tions were assessed.
In late 1974, a settlement conference procedure was created,0 8
requiring the Office of Assessments to hold conferences with the
mine operators to discuss the penalties and review new material
provided by the mine operator. This material is intended to assist
the conference office in reaching a settlement amount agreeable to
all parties. Mine operators also were allowed to recall cases to the
Office of Assessments for conference.' This resulted in the recall
of 4,320 cases to the Office of Assessments for conference. In addi-
tion, 5,465 new cases were referred to a conference. In 1974, settle-
ment conferences were held in 4,501 cases. This left an inventory
of 5,292 cases which were eliminated by late 1976.
These improvements were instituted by the Assessment Office
in an effort to improve the deterrent value of the civil penalties.
The Interior Department recognized that the collection of fines was
a problem and noted with approval that the amount collected
increased dramatically when the procedures discussed above were
instituted. As of January 1976, the total collected under the new
procedures exceeded twenty million dollars."0 ' Efforts are being
made to refine the assessment procedures and to increase the pen-
alties to amounts equal to or greater than the "savings" to the
mine operator in violating the health and safety standards.
B. Recent Supreme Court Decisions on the Assessment Process
The two recent Supreme Court decisions, National Indepen-
198 Id.
30 C.F.R. § 100.8 (1975).
1974 Annual Report at 17.
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dent Coal Operators Association v. Kleppe0 ' and Kleppe v. Delta
Mining, Inc.,2' which have been discussed earlier, have removed
the major roadblock to collection of the approximately 2,500 cases
which had been referred to various United States Attorney's Off-
ices for collection. Although the decisions are too recent for their
full impact to be felt, efforts are being made to expedite the collec-
tion of penalties in many old cases now languishing before district
courts. These collection cases involve the most recalcitrant mine
operators in all the various mining regions. Many of these opera-
tors felt that the law would disappear and that the government was
not serious in its desire to collect mandatory civil penalties. Many
of the coal operators who paid their civil penalties felt that it was
unfair that some mine operators could go years without paying
anything. Among the fraternity of coal operators the message now
is clearly that the Act is here to stay. It is certain that the collec-
tion of these cases although expedited, will be met with resistance.
Jury trials and future legal challenges will result. Importantly
though, mandatory civil monetary penalties have cleared their
first major hurdle.
VI. CONCLUSION
In enacting the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
196903 Congress has resurrected and given new life to the tradi-
tional civil monetary penalty sanction. In refining this sanction,
Congress has created the mandatory civil penalty. It is mandatory
because for each violation of the Act cited, a fine must be assessed.
This sanction was utilized because it is flexible and is easily tai-
lored to fit the particular infraction of the standards involved. It
has the advantage of avoiding the all or nothing approach of permit
revocation and is an excellent tonic for malum prohibitum acts.
The most important advantage of the mandatory civil penalty is
that it is not a criminal sanction. Since it is not criminal in nature,
the enforcement proceedings can, for the most part, be carried out
by the agency itself, thereby saving the courts and the Department
of Justice for more pressing matters. This administrative advan-
tage is not achieved without costs, however. The defendant in a
civil penalty proceeding is not entitled to the same rights as a
defendant in a criminal action. This has resulted in much opposi-
-' 423 U.S. 388 (1976).
212 423 U.S. 403 (1976).
2 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970).
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tion to these penalties, since a person subject to civil monetary
penalties often feels entitled to the rights of a criminal defendant.
Case law traditionally has treated the government as civil
plaintiff as it has any other civil plaintiff. Early cases, as dis-
cussed, were unequivocal. Later cases begin to move from this
position, and courts are beginning to look behind the congressional
label of "civil". With the increasing trend of governmental regula-
tion, courts will certainly examine closely their traditional posi-
tions. A monetary fine has the same impact on the defendant
whether it is denominated civil or criminal. This, of course, is the
crux of the debate. Defendants are fined under the civil monetary
system without being given full rights accorded to criminal defen-
dants. Local mine operators, many of whom are prominent busi-
nessmen, are being assessed monetary penalties for acts which at
best are malum prohibitum, without being accorded the rights
given to a common criminal.
Trial courts faced with this situation will entertain the idea
of granting these defendants rights not normally given in a civil
proceeding. What may be created is a quasi-criminal action. This
action would require that selective rights be given a defendant
because the federal government is the plaintiff. How many addi-
tional rights would be conferred is unknown. Courts might, how-
ever, use this quasi-criminal action as a method to control govern-
ment regulation and to force the central bureaucracy to become
more aware of local problems.
Criminal monetary penalties, individual civil penalties, cor-
porate penalties, and other specialized monetary penalties are
clearly being relegated to the role of backup penalty provisions
reserved for special violators of congressionally mandated stan-
dards. These penalties give added sanctions to the administrator
to punish serious violators. The courts will clearly treat these types
of violations as more serious, and a defendant will be accorded full
rights in the criminal penalty actions and perhaps in the other
specialized actions as well.
Given this legal context involving increasing challenges to the
concept of imposing civil monetary penalties, how effective are
these penalties as a deterrent in enforcing compliance with a com-
prehensive health and safety program? A comparison of two strik-
ingly similar statutes, the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine
[Vol. 79
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Safety Act"04 and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969,205 one lacking a comprehensive monetary penalty system and
the other containing far-reaching and innovative monetary penal-
ties, reveals that the Metal Mine Act provisions are not being as
vigorously enforced as those of the Coal Mine Act. The Metal Mine
Act is generally considered a weak statute. The Coal Mine Act,
with mandatory civil penalties, individual civil penalties, corpo-
rate civil penalties and criminal penalties, is vigorously enforced
and is widely felt to be the more effective of the two statutes. This
effectiveness is due, in large part, to the congressional demand that
each and every violation of the law be assessed a civil penalty.
These mandatory civil penalties have been controversial. The
entire assessment procedure has been under serious challenge. The
challenge of the National Independent Coal Operators Association
v. Kleppe,06 had cast doubt on the entire assessment process. This
challenge lias been firmly rebuffed by the Supreme Court and the
effects of that decision are yet to be felt.
The mandatory civil penalty provisions have resulted in ap-
proximately 100,000 violations a year being referred to the Office
of Assessments. This tremendous flow of violations has resulted in
untimely and inconsistent assessments. To further exacerbate the
problems surrounding civil penalties, settlements have been
reached which were significantly lower than the amounts originally
assessed. There were, moreover, inadequate controls to assure that
violations assessed were collected or settled. These legal and ad-
ministrative problems have limited the deterrent value of the no-
tice of violation. The nexus between the notice of violation and the
assessed penalty was not clearly established to the mine operator.
To increase the effectiveness of the civil penalty, the Secretary
of the Interior in 1974, ordered that the backlog of unassessed
notices of violation be reduced, that the assessment procedure be
revised, and that all parties involved in enforcement coordinate
their efforts. The three goals of timeliness, consistency, and rele-
vancy were established. Because of these strong efforts, the goals
are being reached and the deterrent effect of the mandatory civil
penalty has been enhanced.
"1 30 U.S.C. §§ 721 et seq. (1966).
30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970).
423 U.S. 388 (1976).
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Even with the optimistic legal and factual assessments dis-
cussed above, the future of the mandatory civil penalty is uncer-
tain. Opposition to civil monetary penalties is likely to increase as
more enforcement actions are brought in the federal courts. Chal-
lenges to these civil penalties will affect enforcement, and district
courts will be forced to struggle with the difficult constitutional
issues surrounding civil penalties.
Challenges to the enforcement provisions of the congressional
programs in matters of health, safety or the environment will open
up a new battleground. The mandatory civil penalty provisions of
the Coal Mine Act are moving into a new successful stage of
achieving deterrence. The only obstacle now will be the role of the
district courts in the de novo review proceedings under the Coal
Mine Act. At issue will be whether civil penalty collection cases
can be speedily processed or are destined to be tied up in pro-
tracted litigation. This litigation would challenge the very nature
of the civil monetary penalty and might result in the creation of a
quasi-criminal action, but would also result in additional delay.
This delay will burden court dockets with thousands of civil pen-
alty cases. Deterrence will be weakened, and congressional policy
defeated.
This is the uncertain future which awaits the mandatory civil
penalty provisions of the Coal Mine Act. The first jury trial has yet
to be held. The legal challenges are just beginning. Without strong
leadership from the courts, this flexible and efficient sanction will
be bogged down in more delay, and enforcement of congressional
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